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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an overview of recent trends in the U.S. basic
industries. It first documents the dramatic fall in their shares of domestic
employment and globalproduction.It then considers explanations for these
industriest relative --and,in some instances, absolute --decline.Those
explanations fall into two categories: domestic explanations which focus on
the decisions of labor, management and government, and international
explanations which focus on the tendency of the product cycle to continually
shift the production of established products and standardized processes to
newly-industrializing countries.
This review suggests that the recent difficulties of the U.S. basic
industries have resulted not from one or the other of these factors but from
their interplay. Insofar as product-cycle-based shifts in the international
pattern of comparative advantage have contributed to recent difficulties, some
decline in the U.S. basic industries is both inevitable --barringincreased
protection --andjustifiable on efficiency grounds. Insofar as labor,
management and government decisions share responsibility, the recent
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References 81Capitalism, as Joseph Schumpeter defined it, is a process of creative
destruction. In a market economy, one should expect new products,
processes and even producers to surplant their predecessors in the normal
course of events. Yet Schumpeter's metaphor provides little comfort to
employees and shareholders of basic industries in the United States, all of
which are suffering the effects of foreign competition. The American steel
industry is the most dramatic case in point: between 1979 and 1985, the
number of wage employees there declined from 342,000 to 151,000, while the
percentage rate of return on stockholders' equity fell from 5.8 to _18.5.1
Recent trends in the automobile, textile and apparel industries, while
somewhat less alarming, similarly convey an impression of U.S. basic
industries in steady and perhaps irreversible decline.
In this paper, I first document the dramatic fall in the shares of
U.S. basic industries in domestic employment and global production.I then
consider explanations for these industries' relative --and,in some
instances, absolute --decline.Those explanations fall into two categories:
domestic and international. Domestic explanations focus on the decisions of
three sets of actors: management, labor and government. Management is
blamed for ill-advised decisions (O'Boyle, 1983), labor for high wage costs
(Kreinin, 1984), government for harmful tax, trade and macroeconomic
policies (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). International explanations focus
on the tendency of the product cycle to continually shift the production of
established products and standardized processes to newly-industrializing
countries (due to what Alexander Gerschenkron called, in now unfashionable—2—
parlance, the advantages of "economic backwardness").2 Late industrializers,
it is argued, while lacking the infrastructure to be in the forefront of
innnovation, have the advantage of low labor and material costs when it comes
to the production of established goods using standardized technologies.
The problem which plagues this search for culprits should be familiar to
fans of the board game "Clue." As in "Clue," the problem is one of too
many suspects, and some method is required to eliminate candidates. Oneof
the findings of Section 1 is a striking contrast in the recent fortunes of
the American steel industry on the one hand and the automotive and textile
industries on the other, steel continuing to spiral downward, automobiles and
textiles showing signs of greater stability. For an explanation of recent
difficulties in the basic industries to be convincing, it must be capable of
accounting for this contrast. Much of the analysis that follows is organized
around the contrasting experiences of these industries.
After documenting recent trends in the U.S. basic industries, I decompose
those trends into components associated with the rise of competing supplies,
the growth of demand, and changes in competitiveness. First, I consider the
rise of competing supplies, contrasting product cycle explanations that view
shifts in the location of basic industries as a natural consequence of the
international diffusion of standardized technologies with explanations that
emphasize the influence of public policy. Evidence on the diffusion of
established technologies, while confirming the importance of the product
cycle, suggests also that continued innovation in the United States can
preserve important segments of the U.S. basic industries. Next, I examine
global trends in demand for the products of basic industries. Because there—3—
is a strong correlation between the intensity of demand-side pressures and the
severity of the problems faced by the basic industries, I conclude that
demand-side factors have played an important role in recent trends. Finally,
I analyze factors influencing the competitiveness of basic industries in the
United States and abroad, ranging from labor costs, work conditions,
management strategies and investment decisions to the macro, trade and tax
policies of governments.
A central message of this paper is that monocasual explanations for the
recent difficulties of U.S. basic industries conceal more than they reveal.
Those difficulties reflect both the efficient interplay of market forces
(driven largely by economic development abroad), and inefficiencies resulting
from labor, management and government decisions which have proven ill-advised
in light of subsequent events. Insofar as product-cycle-based shifts in the
international pattern of comparative advantage have contributed to recent
difficulties, some decline in the U.S. basic industries is both inevitable --
barringmeasures to isolate the U.S. market from international competition --
andjustifiable on efficiency grounds. Insofar as labor, management and
government decisions share responsibility, the recent difficulties of U.S.
basic industries may be at least partially reversible.
To the extent that these factors vary in importance across industries -—
indeedacross segments of the same industry --itis misleading to offer an
undifferentiated assessment of the prospects of the basic industries in the
United States. Much depends on the facility with which different segments of
those industries adopt new technologies eminating from the high—tech sector.
The steel industry, for example, is increasingly bifurcated into a declining-4-
segment dominated by large-scale integrated works and a more profitable,
technologically—progressive segment dominated by minimills. Similarly, the
application of new technologies holds out more promise for the survival and
prosperity of some segments of the US. automobile and textile industries than
for others. In consequence, it is increasingly difficult to analyze the basic
industries as a monolithic bloc and even to distinguish them clearly from the
high-tech sector.
1. Recent Trends -inU.S.Basic Industries
It is not immediately clear what industries should be defined as basic.
Basic industries are typically thought to be those which traditionally loomed
large in U.S. industrial production and have fallen recently on hard times:
iron and steel, textiles and apparel, and motor vehicles. These industries
are lumped together more for their long-standing importance to the U.S.
economy, their recent difficulties, and their regional concentration than for
their innate economic characteristics. Technically, basic industries are
those situated far upstream in the input-output table. Their products serve
as inputs into production in a variety of other sectors. They are
distinguished by the age of the industry and of the enterprise. Their
technology is relatively standardized. Production is often capital intensive,
and there exist barriers to entry. Textiles, apparel, motor vehicles and
steel satisfy these criteria to differing extents. While the steel industry
is relatively far upstream, aged and capital intensive, the speed with which
its technology evolves resembles the high-tech industries. The textile and
apparel industries, while relatively old and heavily dependent on standardizedFigure 1










technologies, are not situated so far upstream (in the sense that they rely as
much on consumer as producer goods markets), are labor rather than capital
intensive and until recently have exhibited few entry barriers. Despite the
difficulties posed by the terminology, in this paper I adopt the popular
definition of basic industries and focus on steel, motor vehicles, textiles
and apparel.
Figures 1 through 3 show trends and fluctuations in output, employment
and import penetration in these industries since the 1973 peak.3 In Figure 1,
the cyclical volatility of steel and motor vehicle output contrasts with the
relative stability of textile and apparel production. While textile and
apparel production showed no trend through 1979, output in the two industries
fell by 10 and 20 per cent, respectively, between 1979 and 1985. In contrast,
both steel and auto production fell sharply during the 1973-75 and 1979-81
recessions. While vehicle production tended to make up lost ground following
each cyclical downturn, steel output appears to have ratcheted down to
permanently lower levels. That ratchet effect was twice as severe in the
1979-82 recession as in 1973-75. Whereas automobile production had fully
recovered by 1977, steel production remained 17 per cent below 1973 levels.
Similarly, whereas vehicle production had recovered to within 5 per cent of
1979 levels by 1985, steel production remained 35 per cent below these
levels.
Trends in employment, in Figure 2, mirror the trends in output in
Figure i. Textile and apparel employment declined gradually over the period
(as it has since World War II), reflecting the loss of more than 200,000 jobs
between 1973 and 1985 (amounting to nearly ten per cent of industry employment2
Trenchin US Ba!ic1rtdustrj Etip1oyterr 19?3:19)
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at the beginning of the period). Employment in steel moved in similar manner
until 1979, after which it declined sharply; by 1985 employment in the steel
industry was barely 40 per cent of 1973 levels. Employment in the motor
vehicle and equipment industry, in contrast, has been dominated not by a sharp
downward trend but by pronounced cyclical fluctuations although, as
foreign—based companies establish and increase production in the United
States, the share of the four U.S.—based companies in U.S. vehicle employment
continues to decline.
Together, changes in output and employment provide a perspective on
industry adjustment. Comparing Figures 1 and 2, one finds that only in motor
vehicles did the percentage change in output significantly exceed the
percentage change in employment between 1973 and 1985. In steel, employment
has fallen considerably more than output, especially over the second half of
the period when low-productivity plants were closed and a number of products
with high labor requirements were abandoned. In textiles and apparel,
employment has fallen slightly more than output, especially over the first
half of the period. In both of these industries, the decline in labor/output
ratios reflects substitution of capital for labor designed to increase
productivity. In contrast, the maintenance of relatively high levels of
employment in motor vehicles, especially between 1973 and 1979, reflects
anticipations of producers that industry demand would soon recover.5
Figure 3 displays import penetration ratios (shares of domestic sales or
apparent consumption accounted for by imports).6 The reason for concern over
imports is obvious. In all three industries, the share of the domestic market








approximately 15 to fully 25 per cent in automobiles and steel and to nearly
35 per cent in textiles. The timing of the import surge varies among
industries, however, and there is no direct correspondence between movements
in the import penetration ratio and trends in output and employment. In
textiles and steel, the surge in import penetration began in 1980—81. In the
case of textiles it proceeded steadily, while in the case of steel it was
interrupted in 1983 and again in 1985, coincident with the implementation of
two sets of voluntary export restraints. These two interruptions to the rise
in steel imports fully account for the lower import penetration ratio in steel
than in textiles in 1985. The case of automobiles is very different. The
surge in import penetration began earlier, in 1978-79, but decelerated,
leveled off and ultimately declined in the early 1980s, again coinciding with
the adoption of voluntary export restraints. Reinforcing the impression
conveyed by their output and employment experiences, the import-penetration
performance of the automobile industry looks very different from that of
textiles and steel.
Tables 1 through 7 provide an international perspective on trends in
basic industry production. Three features stand out from Tables 1-3,
concerned with metals production. Three features stand out. First, there has
been a dramatic shift in the locus of production from developed to developing
countries. The same pattern is evident in iron and steel, non-ferrous metals
and metal products alike, as if common market forces underlie recent trends.
Second, trends in production in centrally-planned economies (dominated in the
1980s by China and Romania) have tended to mirror trends in the developing





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































production. Third, U.S. output has been sustained most successfully in the
more technologically advanced stages of production.
As illustrated by the contrast between the 8 1/2 per cent annual rate of
growth of iron and steel production in developing countries and the 2 1/2 per
cent annual rate of decline in developed nations, the US, is not alone among
developed countries in suffering a decline in iron and steel output. Even
Japanese output fell between 1974 and 1983, a trend which has accelerated
recently as Japanese finished steel production fell by 6.3 per cent between
the first half of 1985 and the first half of 1986, Japanese exports fell by
15.5 per cent and Japanese imports (notably from South Korea, Brazil, South
Africa and Taiwan) rose by 51.4 per cent. But the rate of decline of the U.S.
share of world output is exceptional, the U.S. share of total world raw steel
production falling from 17 per cent in 1976 to 11 per cent in 1985.
Trends in non-ferrous metals (tin, copper, etc.), in Table 2, display a
similar pattern, with production by developing countries rising dramatically
and that by developed nations stagnating. Of the country groups considered,
only in the U.S. did production fall absolutely, however. Even that decline,
at a rate of one per cent per annum, is small compared to the experience of
iron and steel.
Table 3 shows that the U.S. maintained its position relatively well in
the more advanced stages of metal production and fabrication. Despite a
decline in developed country output and a rise in developing country
production not unlike those apparent in Table 1, U.S. output remained steady
over the 1974-83 period, in contrast to the less impressive performance of the
Canadian and European industries. U.S. performance in metal fabrication inlarge part reflects the bouyant state of domestic demand, since it occurred
despite a steady deterioration in the trade balance -in steel-containing goods.
Trends in textiles, apparel and footwear, in Tables 4 through 6, are more
heterogeneous. As -in metals, production tended to shift from developed to
developing and centrally-planned economies over the course of the decade. In
comparison to metals, however, these shifts were small, and -in both textile
and clothing the growth of output by centrally-planned economies exceeded that
by developing nations. Compared to steel there has also been more variation
in output trends within the developed world. In textiles, for example, North
American output rose slightly, while production elsewhere in the DECO fell.
In clothing, in contrast, U.S. and Japanese output contracted, while
production elsewhere in the OECD increased. Footwear production fell sharply
in the U.S. and the EEC while remaining stable in Japan and rising elsewhere
-in the OECD. The heterogeneity of response suggests that variations in trade
and industrial policies (in non-market economies, planning) played an even
larger role in textile trade and production than in iron and steel.
The experience of the global motor vehicle industry contrasts with that
of both textiles and steel. Production by developed countries grew
respectably over the period, increasing most rapidly -in Japan, of course, but
expanding also in non—EEC Europe (notably Scandinavia), the U.S. and Canada.
Only in the EEC did vehicle production actually decline. The astounding rates
of growth of output -in developing countries reflect the low levels from which
production started -in the early 1970s and the takeoff of automobile industries
in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan.-10--
2.Growth of Competing Supplies
As the preceding analysis makes clear, a leading influence over the
state of the U.S. basic industries has been the growth of competing supplies.
Does this growth of foreign competition reflect inexorable shifts in the
pattern of international comparative advantage, or are foreign government
policies designed to promote the expansion of these industries be held
responsible for recent trends?
The Product Cycle
According to models of the international product cycle, a pioneering
producer of steel, automobiles and textiles like the United States should
expect its share of global output to erode as production processes are
standardized and diffuse to newly industrializing countries. While an economy
with a comparative advantage in the development of new products and processes
will be the initial home of new industries, as products and processes are
standardized and technological know—how spreads, the location of production
will shift to other countries. The pioneering producer will retain a
productivity advantage only if its rate of development of new processes
exceeds their rate of international diffusion.
The first industry in which product cycle forces can be observed is
cotton textiles. In the 19th century, the mechanism by which
industrialization initially spread from Britain to the Continent, North
America and then other parts of the world was the diffusion of English-based
spinning and weaving technologies. As early importers of British
technologies, U.S. textile producers had begun to fear by the end of the 19th—11—
century that they were being placed at a competitive disadvantage by the
continuing spread of textile technology to lower—wage parts of the world.
Although innovation by the American industry helped to stem this tide, other
producers quickly began to emulate American example. Japanese firms, for
example, after having turned for advice to English machinery manufacturers in
the 1870s and 1880s and adopting the mule spinning technology favored in
Britain, quickly shifted to the ring spinning technology developed in the
United States. The Japanese industry expanded rapidly: by the interwar
period, textile goods accounted for fully half of Japanese exports. But as
the technology continued to diffuse, Japan's share of world textile exports
fell. By the late 1950s she had begun to import textiles, and by 1978 imports
reached 18 per cent of domestic sales. In 1979 Japan's textile trade balance
was in deficit for the first time in modern history.
The second phase in the textile industry product cycle, which took place
between the late 1930s and early 1960s, was dominated by American technologies
for the production of synthetics and blended fibers. Like their predecessors,
these methods were labor intensive and readily emulated. Hence the location
of production continued to shift toward the NIC5, for whom the textile
industry is an important source of total manufacturing production and
employment. (See Tables 4-5 above.) The diffusion of knowledge has been
accelerated by the aggressive international sales activities of textile
machinery companies, including those based in the United States. Today more
than 100 countries ship textile and apparel products to the U.S.
The product cycle in the steel industry has been even more dramatic,
since it has been compressed into such a short time span. In Japan, for—12—
example, where the steel industry was relatively small and inefficient prior
to World War II, the transfer of advanced technologies was concentrated -in the
25 years immediately following the war. In the 1960s Japanese producers
greatly expanded productive capacity, surpassing U.S. producers in their rate
of adoption of new technologies such as the basic oxygen furnace and in the
construction of large greenfield plants offering economies of scale. A significant
aspect of these programs was the Japanese industry's continued dependence on
foreign technology. As late as 1961, over 60 per cent of the Japanese
industry's sales were dependent on technology imported from abroad, mainly
from the United States. Over the course of that decade, foreign technologies
were adapted and the pace of Japanese innovation accelerated. By 1967 the
share of sales dependent on foreign technology had fallen to eight per cent,
and by the 1970s Japan had begun to export technology to the United States.8
Production by Third World countries, who remain heavily dependent on
foreign technologies, increased dramatically (by nearly 150 per cent) between
1970 and 198O. While developing-country steel industries are only
occasionally multinational, technology transfer still takes place through
direct foreign involvement. China, for example, has relied successively on
Soviet, Japanese and, to a lesser extent, West German expertise, in 1978
signing an agreement with Nippon Steel for the construction of a greenfield,
fully-integrated plant at Shanghai and for the addition of a wide hot-strip
mill to existing works at Wuhan. As part of this agreement, the Japanese
offered to train Chinese technicians to operate the new works. In South
Korea, advanced technology has been transferred whole with the assistance of
foreign advisers. In Brazil, an exception to the rule that steel industries-13-
tend to be indigenous, two of the three largest private steel companies have
significant European and Japanese participation. Brazil's new Tuberao plant
is a joint venture with the Japanese and Italians. As a rule, however,
government ownership predominates, and direct foreign financial involvement is
rare.
As in steel, technology transfer in automobile production has been
expedited by direct foreign involvement (often on the part of U.S. firms).
But in contrast to steel, the multinational form dominates. This has been
true even of Japan, GM and Ford having operated plants there from the
mid—1920s to the end of the 1930s. The alternative, obtaining designs and
tooling from abroad, is rendered difficult by foreign exchange shortages like
those which hindered Japanese efforts in the 1950s and plague developing
countries today. Compared to the other basic industries, product cycle forces
operate slowly in the automobile industry since motor vehicles are exceedingly
complex to produce and market. Major mechanical components such as engines
and transmissions tend to be produced using automated, capital-intensive
methods; because of high capital and low labor requirements, LOC5 have no
obvious comparative advantage. "Finish parts" such as exterior body stamping
and moldings must fit precisely and be adapted to market demands. Again,
there may be disadvantages associated with the use of relatively inexperienced
labor and advantages from proximity to the consumer. LDCs' most obvious
comparative advantage therefore lies in the production of minor mechanical
components such as starters, springs and wiring harnesses.
While for the immediate future foreign sourcing of minor mechanicals is
likely to remain the principal form of LOC auto production affecting U.S.-14-
automakers, import competition from developing countries promises to have an
increasingly powerful impact on the economy end of the U.S. market. The
Hyundai, imported from Korea, in 1986 enjoyed the highest first-year sales
ever recorded by an import and undoubtedly figured in GM's decision to halt
production of its subcompact, the Chevrolet Chevette. This plus the
introduction of the Yugo (manufactured in Yugoslavia) led to plans to import a
similar economy car, the Proton Saga, from Malaysia. Meanwhile, established
companies have developed plans to produce cars in LOCs for sale in the U.S.
(Volkswagen in Brazil, Pontiac and Ford in Korea, Mercury in Mexico, Dodge in
Thailand). For the time being, LDC competition is heavily concentrated at the
bottom of the product line. The critical issue from the standpoint of U.S.
companies is whether --or,more precisely, when and to what extent --these
countries will begin to penetrate other segments of the American market.
Government Policy
Even while product-cycle influences were shifting the locus of basic
industry production from the U.S. to other parts of the world, foreign
government policies could have been operating simultaneously to speed the
process. The recent debate over the extent and effectiveness of foreign
industrial targeting and export subsidization focuses on the latter set of
influences. Following Krugman (1984), it is useful to distinguish three
categories of policy: financial support (such as tax relief and privileged
access to capital markets), control of product market access (through tariffs,
quantitative restrictions and administrative guidance), and government control
of industry conduct (through the encouragement of mergers, joint ventures, and
collusive pricing policies).—15—
The efficacy of these policies might be judged according to several
criteria. Did they raise foreign output, employment and exports? Didthey
reduce foreign production costs? Did the returns on these policies exceed the
costs from a national point of view? Finally, and this is the criterion
relevant here, did foreign policies accentuate the shift in basic industry
production from the United States and contribute to U.S. industry's
competitive difficulties?
The extent to which governments have promoted the growth of their basic
industries is notoriously difficult to quantify. How, for example, is one to
measure the impact of moral suasion designed to encourage banks to lend money
to enterprises in a particular sector? Despite these difficulties, some
general conclusions about the impact of policy on the basic industries can be
offered. It is clear, for example, that policy played an important role in
the growth of the Japanese steel and automobile industries in the 1950s; in
the 1970s and 1980s, in comparison, its influence has been much diminished.
In the 'fifties, the Japanese steel market was protected by stringent import
restrictions which increased the profitability of domestic production and
permitted the industry to produce at minimum efficient scale. Low-interest
loans and tax concessions provided added incentive to invest. Although these
policies remained in place into the 1970s, by the mid-1960s Japanese
competitiveness had improved to a point where import restrictions were
redundant. By the mid—1970s policy shifted toward restraining the industry's
growth to avoid exacerbating trade conflicts with other industrial countries.
As in steel, the growth of Japan's automobile industry was stimulated in
the 1950s by prohibitive barriers to imports and by statutes requiring that—16—
companies be Japanese owned. Half the cost of a new automobile factory could
be written off in the first year of operation. In the 1980s, in contrast, few
such tax concessions have been available. Over the entire period 1966-81,
Nissan paid an average effective corporate tax rate of 35 per cent.1°
Although various tax and financial incentives have been provided the
Japanese textile industry, the government's basic strategy has been one of not
interfering with the decline of employment. The share of textile
manufacturing in Japanese employment fell from 23 per cent in 1955 to 13.2 per
cent in 1979, with 18 per cent of Japanese textile jobs lost in the 1970s
alone. The late 1970s saw more than a thousand Japanese textile firm
bankruptcies per annum. The implications of these developments for Japanese
output are evident in Tables 4 and 5. Some steps were taken to slow the
industry's contraction, notably provision of concessional financing for
development of new merchandise, modernization of equipment, and investment in
R&D. But despite these examples to the contrary, Japanese textile-industry
policy has generally emphasized adjustment rather than job retention.
Policy in Europe, in contrast, has focused more directly on stemming the
decline of basic industry employment. In the early 1970s, government
initiatives tended to be indirect, taking the form of measures to encourage
private lending for rationalization and modernization, for example. Funds for
the French steel industry were raised through government efforts to promote
the formation of an industry—wide syndicate to market bonds to the small
investor. Banks were encouraged by the state to aid in the industry's
modernization. As the financial condition of Europe's basic industries
worsened, however, governments became increasingly involved directly in the—17--
provision of financial assistance. In 1978 the French government implemented
a restructuring program which guaranteed the industry's debts.11 In several
other European countries transfers from general revenues have been needed to
permit publicly-owned companies to service debt and continue operations.
Subsidies and grants extended to the steel industry by members of the EC have
been estimated at 70 billion OM between 1980 and 198512 Most of these
measures have been taken in concert through the offices of the EC Commission.
As with its policy toward steel, the objective of European textile policy
has been to prevent the erosion of employment. Starting in the 1970s,
Belgium, Italy and the UK offered textile firms substantial subsidies and in
some cases experimented with nationalization. In Norway, the textile industry
was provided relief from social security payments and financial support for
investment in machinery. France provided transitional assistance to small and
medium-sized firms and subsidized technological research to increase
productivity. The Netherlands initially permitted the market to operate
freely but, once more than half of all textile jobs in Holland disappeared
between 1970 and 1976, intervened with loans and with investment and current
expenditure subsidies for cotton, rayon, linen and clothing producers. If
anything, the scope of such policies has expanded in recent years. France,
for example, recently announced a program providing relief from social
security contributions to textile firms which maintain or increase employment
and investment. The Belgian government recently proposed extending loans and
interest rate subsidies to firms promising to retain at least 90 per cent of
their labor forces.'3
Have these policies contributed in important ways to the competitive
difficulties of U.S. basic industries? Krugman (1984) argues no. Taking-18-
steel as an example, he points out that Japanese policies served to subsidize
industry expansion in the 1950s but not subsequently. One would have to
document persistent links from the learning effects of the 'fifties to costs
of production in the 'seventies in order to establish the relevance of
Japanese subsidies to current trends in competitiveness. Krugman argues
further that European policies have been "more a bailout for bondholders than
a subsidy for production or for the creation of new capacity" (Krugman, 1984,
p.11?).
It is true that the direct effects of Japanese policies are small; one
study estimates that between 1951 and 1975 loans by public institutions,
export promotion schemes and other assistance measures reduced the cost of a
net ton of Japanese steel by no more than $0.45 U.S. (out of an estimated
Japanese cost of production in 1975 of roughly $150 U.S.).14 Nearly every
study of government assistance to the Japanese steel industry has arrived at
similar conclusions. But European subsidies, in contrast with Japan's, have
not been uniformly small; studies of European financial assistance to the
steel industry in the mid—1970s yielded estimates of implicit subsidies in the
range of $2 US per net product ton.
Even if European financial policies did not increase production or
stimulate the creation of new capacity, as Krugman concludes, they surely
prevented production and capacity from shrinking at the rates that would have
been dictated by market forces alone. Even if European production subsidies
and import restraints have primarily affected Japanese exporters, the U.S.
industry is indirectly affected due to the integration of global commodity
markets. Japanese steel exports that might be sold in Europe in the absence—19—
of governmental intervention there tend to be diverted to other countries,
leading other producers, who might have concentrated on those markets -in the
absence of Japanese competition, to divert their own exports to still other
markets, including that of the United States. Due to market integration, the
mere fact that subsidies to the steel industry have been relatively generous
in countries which are not among the leading exporters to the United States
does not establish that they were without implications for the competitiveness
of American producers. Policies increasing supply or restricting demand tend
to have indirect repercussions on the United States wherever they occur.
Observers have argued further that Japanese firms have been favored by
privileged access to borrowed funds, as a result of which their basic
industries have enjoyed an artificially low cost of capital. The only
systematic comparison of the corporate cost of capital in Japan and the U.S.,
that of Ando and Auerbach (1985), suggests that, while this may have been true
for the economy as a whole, the argument has not applied to the basic
industries since the mid—1960s. Ando and Auerbach compare price-earnings
ratios for samples of Japanese and U.S. companies as a measure of required
rates of return. For their samples of roughly 20 U.S. and 20 Japanese
companies for the period 1966-81, the median average return to (or cost of)
capital is 10.3 per cent for the U.S. and 9.5 per cent for Japan. In other
words, Japanese firms were able to pay their shareholders a rate of return 0.8
per cent less than that required of their American counterparts. While the
differences initially appear to be larger for steel and autos (in both
industries Japanese firms have substantially lower returns on (and costs of)
capital than their U.S. counterparts), corrections for depreciation,-20-
inventories and inflation change the picture.15 While tending to further
increase the cost-of-capital advantage for the Japanese economy as a whole,
these corrections raise the returns to the U.S. steel and auto industries
compared to their Japanese counterparts. For example, the before-tax cost of
capital for U.S. Steel is estimated at 17.8 per cent, compared with 22.0 per
cent for Kawasaki and 23.1 for Nippon Steel. Costs of capital for Ford and GM
averaged 15.5 and 17.3 per cent respectively, compared with 18.4 per cent for
Nissan. Adjustments for taxation only reinforce the conclusion, since
Japanese industry in general and auto and steel firms in particular paid
higher corporate taxes than their U.S. counterparts. Thus, if Japanese firms
benefited from a lower cost of capital, the benefits did not extend to autos
and steel. And, since the 1960s, direct government policy in the form of
corporate tax policy has not worked in the favor of Japan's basic industries.
3.Lagging Demand
The U.S. steel, textile nor automobile industries are all import—
competing industries. Hence domestic market growth largely determines the
state of industry demand.
The U.S. basic industries all have suffered from secular declines in
demand but to differing extents. The most dramatic decline, that experienced
by the steel industry, is portrayed in Figure 4, which shows U.S. apparent
steel consumption relative to real GNP and its trend over a longer period
starting in 1960. Although domestic steel use fell significantly over the
period as a whole, domestic demand exhibited little trend in the 1960s but
declined significantly after 1972 and again after 1978.16B.
4





The downward trend in U.S. steel consumption relative to GNP reflects the
tendency of the steel intensity of production to decline as the economy
matures.17 Phases of rapid industrial expansion and reconstruction like those
which followed World War II require inputs of steel for the construction of
railroads, bridges, port facilities, power stations and other infrastructure.
Eventually, investment in infrastructure begins to slow and with it the demand
for steel; the U.S. needs steel bridges f or only one interstate highway
network, for example. Figure 4 suggests that the U.S. had reached this stage
of declining steel intensity by the early 1970s.18
Simultaneously, technological change created increasingly attractive
substitutes for steel. Steel has been replaced by plastic and concrete tubing
in many types of construction, by aluminum and plastic in the production of
food and beverage containers, by plastics in various stages of automobile
production. In several applications, notably automobiles, the shift toward
lighter materials was accentuated by the energy price shocks of 1973 and 1979.
In 1973, when 14.5 million vehicles were sold, Detroit consumed 23 million
tons of steel; in 1985 15.7 million vehicles accounted for only 13 million
tons, a fall of 48 per cent per unit.19 The shift toward steel—substitutes
also can be seen as a corollary of economic maturity, as increasingly
sophisticated technologies require the use of thinner and more formable
materials. While there also exist countervailing trends, such as the
substitution of steel for timber, brick and concrete in construction, overall
these developments have tended to reduce the steel intensity of production.20
Figure 4 also reflects the cyclical sensitivity of steel consumption.
During business cycle downturns, firms delay investment projects and consumersFigure 5









defer purchases of durables. The ratio of apparent steel consumption to real
GNP therefore rises significantly during recoveries and falls during
recessions.21 Consequently, the absence of a notable decline of steel intensity
in the 1960s is attributable in part to the relative buoyancy of the
macroeconomy over the period. Analogously, slower growth over much of the
period since 1973 and the exceptional severity of the post-1979 recession have
exacerbated the industry's demand-side difficulties.
U.S. textile producers also have experienced stagnant domestic demand due
to shifts in expenditure shares and a slowly growing macroeconomy. Global
consumption of textiles has been rising less quickly than total manufacturing
production since the early 1960s. The income elasticity of demand for
clothing is less than unity and is thought to fall with rising incomes.22
Consumers' expenditure on clothing and shoes as a percentage of total private
consumption in the U.S., calculated in current prices as in Figure 5, has
declined from nearly 9.5 per cent in 1960 to less than seven percent.23
Measured in constant prices that share has been more stable; while the
constant—price share trends down over the period as a whole, most of
its decline occurs in the decade of the sixties. Thus, it appears to be
mainly falling prices rather than income inelastic demands or shifting
expenditure patterns that account for the industry's demand-side difficulties.
But the aggregate figures mask a shift toward casual wear at the expense of
formal attire, stimulating the demand for the products of some segments of the
industry while depressing the demand for others.
Motor vehicle apparent consumption as a share of GNP, shown in
Figure 6, while even more volatile than the share of steel, exhibits an almost-23—
imperceptible downward trend.24 Trends in the share of spending on new motor
vehicles in GNP can be decomposed into effects associated with changes in
average vehicle life, "saturation" of the automobile market, and changes in
the relative cost of purchasing and operating vehicles. The rising average
age of passenger cars in use, from 5.7 years in 1973 to 7.5 years in 1984,
reflects the combination of improving durability and relatively slow income
growth over the period. Both the average price of a new car of constant
quality and the real cost per mile of operating a passenger car actually
declined between 1970 and 1983.25 In 1984 the number of cars per thousand
population reached 549 in the United States, by far the world's highest.26
OECD estimates put the saturation point at 700, however, suggesting that the
industry is still far from wholly dependent on replacement demand.27 Thus, not
only does the automobile industry differ from textiles and steel in that
demand has remained relatively stable, but neither the saturation nor the
operating cost argument provides much basis for pessimism about future
demands. At the end of 1984 the Commerce Department forecast that the number
of passenger cars sold in North American would rise by 11 per cent between
1985 and 1990.28 The principal factor likely to depress the quantity of new
vehicles demanded is a rise in their relative price, perhaps due in part to
the restrictive effect of voluntary export restraints on foreign producers.
The effects of these restraints, which tend to raise the share of U.S.
consumer expenditure on passenger cars even while depressing the quantity
sold in the domestic market, are discussed in the section on trade policy
below. But it is already clear that divergent trends in demand play an
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textile industries on the one hand and iron and steel on the other.
4.Private—Sector Determinants of Competitiveness
Labor Costs and Labor Productivity
No factor which figures in the debate over the competitiveness of U.S.
basic industries has attracted more attention than labor costs (see for
example Gomez-Ibanez and Harrison, 1982). The importance of labor costs is
incontrovertible: labor accounts for 46 per cent of total costs in motor
vehicles (Kreinin, 1984, p. 41), roughly 28 per cent of average total costs in
steel (down from 39 per cent in 1976; see Mueller and Kawahito, 1978, p. 19),
and for the great majority of manufacturing costs in apparel. The question is
the extent to which high wages have contributed to competitive difficulties,
particularly in automobiles and steel, and who bears the burden of
responsibility.
Figure 7 shows trends over the last two decades in the average hourly
earnings of employees in U.S. basic industries relative to all manufacturing
employees. The need to distinguish among basic industries is again obvious.
While earnings in textiles and apparel are only 75 per cent of average
manufacturing earnings and in the latter case have continued to decline, steel
and vehicle earnings are at least 125 per cent of the manufacturing average,
with the differential favoring automotive workers rising slowly and that
favoring steelworkers rising rapidly until 1982. The steelworkers' premium
rose from 26 per cent in 1970 to 64 per cent in 1981-82, before falling to 43
per cent in 1985.29
Productivity growth has not offset trends in labor costs, if anything
exacerbating them instead. While hourly output in all manufacturing roseFigure ?
Hourly Earnings in 111S1 Basic lndusfries A1l Manufacturing =1)
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between 1977 and 1982, it changed only slightly in motor vehicles and declined
markedly in iron and steel. Table 8 shows trends over time in U.S. Unit labor
costs (hourly labor costs adjusted for productivity). Nominal Unit labor
costs for all employees, which rose by 30 per cent -in all manufacturing
between 1977 and 1982, rose by 56 per cent in vehicles and 72 per cent in
steel. The impact on costs of the rise in steelworkers' hourly earnings,
which was one and two-thirds as rapid as in all manufacturing, was reinforced
by a 10 per cent decline -in output per hour. The rise in autoworkers'
hourly earnings, which was one and a half times as rapid as in all
manufacturing, was not offset by a relatively small increase in labor
productivity.
Identifying the reasons for these earnings differentials is rendered
difficult by the fact that they incorporate skill differentials, variations
across industries in the use of cooperating factors (capital/labor ratios),
differences in the organization of production, and differences in bargaining
power. A significant portion of the differentials can be explained on the
first three grounds without an appeal to market power or labor-market
imperfections. A crude measure of skill differentials is educational
attainment: in 1975, 30 and 35 per cent of the workforce in textiles and
apparel, respectively, had less than a ninth grade education, compared to 16
per cent for U.S. industry as a whole.3° This contrasts with 18 per cent -in
primary metals, 15 per cent in fabricated metals, and 12 per cent in transport
equipment. Since women comprise some 80 per cent of apparel-industry
employees, in part because the industry provides a convenient port of entry









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































participation may have depressed apparel—industry wages by increasing the
relevant labor supply. Yet Krueger and Summers (1986) find that controlling
for age, education and gender, among other variables, fails to eliminate most
of the observed variation in inter-industry wages. Even with controls, basic
industry wages in 1984 differed from average wages by 19 per cent in transport
equipment, 18 per cent in primary metals, -2 per cent in textiles and -16 per
cent in apparel. Krueger and Summers argue that the interdependence of tasks
encourages the payment of efficiency wages n steel and autos which account
for a portion of the differentials. In textiles and apparel, the diligence of
workers is readily monitored through the inspection of output and the payment
of piece rates, and the costs of employee turnover are relatively low because
of the lesser importance of firm-specific skills. In steel and autos, in
contrast, laborers work cooperatively, rendering their effort difficult to
observe. In addition, turnover costs may be relatively high, making it
efficient for firms to pay wage premia to attract and retain suitable
employees.
None of these factors provides an obvious explanation for the growing
differential between steel and automotive wages on the one hand and textile
and apparel wages on the other, or for the surge in the premium enjoyed by
steel workers after 1970. This leaves the actions of unions and management.
It appears that the two share responsibility the surge in the steelworkers'
premium after 1970, and that import competition played a critical role. When
attempting to rationalize the rise in steel imports that occurred in the
1960s, management tended to focus on the threat of disruptions of domestic
supply. A famous 116 day strike in 1959 forced U.S. steel users to search out—27—
alternative sources. As foreign supplies came to be seen as less volatile and
uncertain than domestic sources, steel imports ratcheted upward every three
years when contracts were negotiated and strike threats were renewed.
Perceiving uncertainty about the availability of domestic supplies as the main
factor contributing to the rise in import penetration and anticipating a
strong domestic market for steel, management attempted to remove supply
disruptions starting in 1974 by offering steelworkers real wage increases of
not less than three per cent per annum in return for foregoing the right to
strike. It was easier for management to blame labor militancy than management
decisions for the difficulty of competing with imports. While removing the
cloud of uncertainty covering domestic supplies, this "Experimental
Negotiating Agreement't and its successors contributed greatly to the surge in
steel-industry labor costs. Thus, management and labor strategies led to the
adoption of policies which in the long run exacerbated problems of cost
competitiveness.
Only in 1983 did the accord break down. By that time the relationship of
cost competitiveness to import penetration could no longer be denied.
Management shifted its attention from supply disruptions to comparative labor
costs, while labor, out of growing concern for employment, moderated its
position on wages, negotiating a nine per cent reduction in total compensation
in the first year of the new steel contract. In 1985, for the first time in
25 years, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) struck a major steel
company (Wheeling-Pittsburgh) after the company had filed for bankruptcy and
unilaterally imposed court-approved reductions in wages and benef its.31 Thus,
both the rise and fall of the steelworkers' premium coincide with changes in
management and labor strategy.-29--
competition has weakened the bargaining position of the unions on balance.
Moreover, the decline in the share of steel and automobile workers unionized
suggests that changes in labor-market power have been working in the wrong
direction.
This brings us to union strategy, the factor emphasized by Lawrence and
Lawrence (1985). They suggest that the price elasticity of demand for labor
is an increasing function of investment --thatindustries engaged in new
investment are better able to substitute plant and equipment for labor when
unions attempt to raise wages, thereby restraining wage demands. Declining
industries in which investment is unprofitable are incapable of responding in
this way, providing an incentive for unions to capture remaining profits by
raising wages, a phenomenon known as "scooping."
The Lawrence and Lawrence interpretation has the virtue of consistency
with recent trends in the automotive industry, where guarded optimism over
medium-term prospects has sustained investment in recent years and declining
automobile sales and plant closings starting in 1979 led to an immediate
moderation in wage trends. After reporting record losses, Chrysler management
entered national contract negotiations in 1979 and obtained a contract under
which the UAW agreed to $203 million in wage concessions over three years. GM
and Ford negotiated new contracts six months prior to the scheduled expiration
of existing agreements; as at Chrysler, automatic wage increases both for
inflation and other reasons were deferred. Only when industry conditions
improved were traditional wage rules reinstated. This interpretation also
provides a consistent explanation for the rise in steelworkers' wages relative
to those of auto workers, assuming that the steel industry's future was-28--
Alternative explanations for changes in labor costs are less
satisfactory. Appealing to the presence of unions is insufficient; even in
the low-wage apparel industry, more than half of employees were unionized in
1975.32 Granting that unions in steel and autos were more cohesive than those
in textiles and apparel, it remains unclear that their actions can account for
the surge in the differential. Economic theory suggests that members of
unions that effectively restrict entry will have higher wages than nonmembers,
not that the differential will rise over time. Nor can the fact that union
wage premia tend to rise in recessions account for these trends in light of
the almost uninterrupted rise in the steelworkers' premium over the decade of
the 'lOs. And while union workers, particularly members of the UAW and USWA,
have had their positions protected by generous cost-of-living escalators,
their earnings premia rose uniformly in periods of low and high inflation
alike.33
If the UAW or USWA were responsible for the widening differential,
therefore, this must reflect changes in their bargaining power or strategy.
In simple models (e.g. Oswald, 1982), the level of wages for which unions
bargain is a function of the elasticity of labor demand alone; insofar as
foreign competition has increased the price elasticity of final demand for the
products of U.S. basic industries and, ceteris paribus, the elasticity of
their derived demands for labor, this should have weakened the unions'
bargaining power and reduced, not increased the differential. Although
voluntary restraint agreements have strengthened the bargaining position of
U.S. auto- and steelworkers over what it would have otherwise been, the
continued rise in the import share of the U.S. market suggests that foreign-30-
recognized as bleak from the early 1970s while the auto industry was expected
to survive. This, however, imputes a remarkable degree of foresight to union
leaders and fails to explain the falling steel industry premium after 1982.
One might attempt to finesse this objective by positing that the U.S. steel
industry is made up of two segments, an integrated sector facing terminal
competitive difficulties, in which unions have been engaged in scooping, and
another comprised of plants which can survive, in wh'ch unions have not
engaged in this practice. The wave of plant closings since the early 1980s
has shifted the mix toward the second segment and resulted in a decline in the
steel earnings premium for the industry as a whole. Ultimately, however, the
problem with this explanation is the implausibility of the notion that as long
as 15 years ago steelworkers recognized the future prospects of their industry
as bleak, particularly in light of the optimism which pervaded the U.S. steel
market in the mid—1970s.
How much labor cost differentials matter for international competitive-
ness depends on unit labor costs abroad. Comparing unit labor costs across
countries is rendered difficult by differences in data, differences in product
mix, and exchange—rate fluctuations. The Department of Labor's estimates of
hourly compensation, which attempt to adjust for these problems, are
summarized in Table g34 Although these estimates should be regarded as
approximations, it is clear, whether the comparison is for 1975 or 1965, that
the ratio of U.S. to foreign labor costs is higher in automobiles and steel
than in all manufacturing, whatever foreign country is considered. The U.S.
steelworkers' and autoworkers' wage premia that emerged in the 1970s were







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































steel- and autoworkers who, like their U.S. counterparts, are better paid than
the average manufacturing worker. Still, at market exchange rates U.S. steel
and automotive wages were in 1975 and 1985 roughly double those of Japan.
Textiles and apparel exhibit a different pattern. In contrast to the
U.S., where textile and apparel workers earn less than the average
manufacturing worker, in most developing countries they earn more.
Nonetheless, there remains a dramatic labor cost differential between the
Asian and Latin American industries on the one hand and those of industrial
countries (including the U.S.) on the other. The U.S. is not alone; as early
as 1975 textile and apparel wages in many European countries exceeded those in
the United States. That they fell back below U.S. levels in 1985 illustrates
the power of exchange rate movements to bring about dramatic shifts in
relative labor costs (see Section 5 and especially Table 15 below).
To assess their implications for competitiveness, labor costs must be
adjusted for productivity. Table 10 presents trends in unit labor costs in
iron and steel in five countries relative since 1964. It speaks to the
question of whether unit labor costs in the U.S. have been rising relatively
rapidly over time, thereby contributing the industry's competitive
difficulties. Before 1977, steel-industry unit labor costs actually rose less
rapidly in the United States. The U.S.-Japanese comparisons are of particular
interest. Although Japanese labor productivity nearly tripled in a period
when U.S. output per worker-hour rose by only 16 per cent, hourly earnings
rose much more rapidly in Japan, reflecting the low level from which they
started. Even though U.S. labor costs have been higher than Japan's, this
shrinking disadvantage cannot account for the American steel industry's-32--
continued loss of market share relative to Japan or for the industry's
worsening (as opposed to persisting) competitive difficulties.
After 1977, conditions changed. The rise in hourly labor costs in the
U.S. vastly exceeded the comparable rise in the Japan. And while Japanese
labor productivity rose, U.S. productivity fell. In part productivity
trends reflect declining U.S. capacity utilization relative to capacity
utilization in Japan, which may itself reflect the competitiveness effects
with which we are concerned but in any case tends to exaggerate the underlying
productivity differential. Nonetheless, the different trends are indicative
of a rapidly worsening Unit cost problem for the U.S. in the second half of
the 1970s.
Fuss and Waverman (1985, 1986) find a similar situation in motor
vehicles. They estimate that the trend rate of productivity growth in motor
vehicles during the period 1970-80 was 4.3 per cent per annum in Japan
compared to only 1.6 per cent per annum in the US. By 1980 American
producers, who possessed a considerable productivity advantage over their
Japanese competitors at the beginning of the 1970s, had fallen behind.
Combined with the labor-cost different apparent in Table 4.2, U.S. producers
were at a long run competitive disadvantage of approximately 12 per cent. As
in steel, U.S. producers' competitive difficulties were reinforced by
relatively low levels of capacity utilization.
Labor Relations and Work Organization
Labor productivity is not an exogenous variable to which labor costs must
adapt. It depends prominently on four sets of factors: labor relations, theTable 10
Unit Labor Costs in Iron and Steel, Five Countries, 1964—81
All Employees (1964 =100)
United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom
Output per Hour
1964 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1972 116.1 219.8 157.1 157.7 130.0
1977 116.0 290.7 172.4 178.6 117.5
1982 107.0 315.7 222.2 212.0 156.9
Hourly Labor Cost*
1964 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1972 160.7 277.4 214.8 210.9 206.1
1977 277.0 645.1 529.1 362.3 507.6
1982 496.3 887.0 1076.2 495.7 1035.0
Unit Labor Cost
(U.S. dollars)
1964 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1972 138.4 150.8 132.7 166.6 142.5
1977 238.7 300.3 305.8 347.2 271.0
1982 463.7 408.7 360.5 382.6 414.6
*Includes nonwage earnings.
Source: United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1984),
"International Comparisons of Productivity and Labor Costs in the Steel
Industry: United States, Japan, France, Germany, United Kingdom; 1964 and
1972-82," unpublished data, January.-33-
organization of work, physical investment, and technological change. Labor
relations have attracted particular attention in the automotive industry,
where Japanese work organization is sometimes viewed as a panacea for
productivity ills. Reflection and experimentation have led to the
realization that, while Japanese modes of organization provide useful lessons
for American industry, -it is neither feasible nor desirable simply to
transplant Japanese approaches. Among the lessons -is the inefficiency of an
adversarial labor-management relationship which neither vests workers with
responsibility for product quality nor taps their knowledge of the production
process, and the ability of an implicit contract promising job security to
reduce workers' fear that increased efficiency will lead to redundancy. How
to apply these lessons in the U.S. context is the unanswered question.
In response to the Japanese example, automotive companies have adopted a
variety of "employee involvement programs."36 In the early 1970s, experiments
were conducted replacing the assembly line with work teams. Initially, sharp
separation was maintained between changes in work organization and bargaining
over compensation, in contrast to Japan. With the expansion of quality— and
productivity-related activities following the 1979 slump in auto sales,
however, negotiations over work organization have become increasingly
integrated with compensation issues, union leaders trading changes in work
rules and conditions for changes in compensation and profit sharing.
To date, there exist no systematic comparisons of productivity in
otherwise equivalent plants using assembly-line and team-production methods.
Insofar as the main effect of the latter has been to increase the flow of
information between labor and management, it is hard to see how it could fail—34-.
to increase productivity. Whether the productivity increase is large is the
open question.
Investment
The other central determinants of productivity growth are investment and
technical progress. Insofar as technical progress in the steel, auto and
textile industries tends to be embodied in new plant and equipment, the
importance of investment is heightened. Investment in the basic industries
depends both on macroeconomic conditions and on sector-specific factors.
To highlight the latter, Figure 8 shows investment in U.S. basic industries as
shares of total manufacturing investment.37 After declining slightly in the
early 1970s, investment in the textile industry has remained steady, even
rising slightly as a share of manufacturing investment in the early 1980s.
The share of automotive investment is more volatile but, like textiles and in
contrast to steel, shows no decisive downward trend. The dramatic fall in
steel-industry investment over the past decade indicates that modernization
has not proceeded at the same rate as in textiles and autos and provides
additional evidence that future prospects for the U.S. steel industry are
bleaker than those for textiles and autos.
Textile-industry investment reflects attempts to cut costs rather than to
expand capacity. Increasing the capital intensity of production enables firms
to minimize the consequences of relatively high U.S. wages.38 Open-ended
spinning (which produces four to five times the output of ring spindles), the
air—jet loom (which is three times as fast as the conventional shuttle) and
computerized finishing are viewed as essential elements of the campaign toI,(I
Figure 8—35-
increase productivity. That investment has been maintained despite more than
250 plant closings since 1979 suggests that a leaner but more modern textile
industry will survive into the foreseeable future. In these respects the
situation in automobiles -is similar to that in textiles, although there have
been instances in recent years where capacity expansion has figured in
investment decisions.
The behavior of steel--industry investment --ordisinvestment --differs
markedly from the automotive and textile cases. Spokesmen assert that the
American steel industry is vigorously "building for the future" by investing
in new technologies.39 However, calculations by Barnett and Schorsch (1983,
ch. 6) suggest that industry investment has been inadequate to maintain the
value of the capital stock since the early 1970s.4° In the last five years,
new expenditures have done little to offset depreciation of existing capital.
Moreover, before 1980 much of this investment took the form of the
development of new iron ore mines and iron pelletizing facilities, from which
a shrunken integrated sector now derives little benefit. Since 1980, much of
that investment which has been undertaken has gone into the construction of
minim-ills rather than the updating of integrated works. Crandall (1985)
calculates that Tobin's q (the market value of capacity in place relative to
its replacement cost) is on the order of 0.1 for the integrated segment of the
industry; it is not surprising that integrated firms, far from adding to
capacity, are closing plants and disinvesting as quickly as possible. At the
end of 1985, the most efficient minimill producers, in contrast to their
integrated brethren, had a q of roughly 1.15, providing scope for continued
investment.-36-
This analysis of investment highlights two distinctions within the basic
industries. First, investment trends imply bleaker prospects for American
steel than for textiles and automobiles. Second, it is critically important
to distinguish the prospects of the minimill subsector from those of
integrated steel.
Choice of Technology
Choice of technology can exercise a decisive influence over production
costs and international competitiveness. U.S. producers have been indicted
for failing to adopt cost-minimizing technologies -including continuous casting
in steel and the air—jet loom in textiles. Since this debate has tended to
center on the choice of technology by the steel industry, this section
focuses on three recent developments in steel production: continuous casting,
the basic oxygen furnace (BOF), and the complex of technologies comprising the
minimill. (Section 7 below discusses subsequent innovations in steel and the
other basic industries.)
Casting is the third of four main stages of primary steelmaking:
smelting, melting, casting and rolling. Continuous casting permits the
elimination of costly and time-consuming discont-inu-ities in the casting
process. In ingot casting, liquid steel is transfered by ladle from the
converter or furnace to ingot molds which are then trimmed, cooled and
solidified, after which the steel is withdrawn from the molds, reheated in
soaking pits and rolled into slabs, blooms or billets. In continuous casting,
liquid steel is transferred in an even stream first into a water-cooled mold
and then to a cooling chamber, from which it is continuously withdrawn by a—37—
system of rollers and upon solidifying is cut into pieces of the required
length. The advantages of continuous casting include yield, which exceeds 95
per cent compared to approximately 80 per cent for semi-finished products made
by rolling ingots in slabbing or blooming/billet mill facilities; improvements
in metallurgical quality, including more consistent chemical composition and
fewer surface defects; energy saving due to the elimination of the
energy-intensive ingot processes; and increased productivity due to the
elimination of several labor-intensive stages in the production process.41.
Following the development of experimental machines in the late 1940s,
commercial introduction of continuous casting occurred between 1952 and the
early 1960s. Continuous casting was first adopted on a large scale in the
late 1960s. Figure 9 compares the course of adoption in the U.S. and abroad,
illustrating the extent to which the U.S. has lagged other countries adopting
this technology. Although the American industry began to close thegap by
constructing or commissioning more than 16 continuous casters between 1981 and
1983, a sizeable shortfall remains.42
Why has the U.S. lagged in adopting this innovation? The answer has
three components: differences in product mix, differences in related
technologies, and differences in rates of growth and investment among national
steel industries. Product mix matters because, until the 1970s, continuous
casters as installed in the U.S. and Western Europe were suitable only for
producing smaller sections (billets and blooms), which have a square cross
section and are therefore relatively easy to cast. Slab continuous casting as
developed in Japan is technologically more sophisticated than billet and bloom
continuous casting and until the 1970s was not widely utilized. In the 1960sFigu 9









the share of U.S. crude steel production technically suited to billet and
bloom continuous casting was lower than in a number of European countr-ies.43
These differences in product mix are attributable to the composition of end
use. Flat-rolled products (sheets and plates, for example) are made from
slabs, whereas beams and rails are made from blooms, wire rod and small
structurals from billets. The U.S. industry's concentration on slabs partly
reflects the importance of U.S. the automobile industry in final demand.
In addition, the cost savings derived from Continuous casting depend on
the type of furnace capacity in place. The diffusion of continuous casting
was favored by the presence of oxygen converters and retarded by the presence
of open hearth. As late as 1984, fully nine per cent of U.S. crude steel
production used the open-hearth furnace, a technology that had disappeared in
Japan and all but vanished in Europe.44 But there must be more to the story:
Figure 10 shows that, while the U.S. in 1984 had both a relatively low share
of continuously cast steel and a relatively high share of open hearth
capacity, there exists no simple relationship between the two variables.45
This is because the rate of adoption of continuous casting has also been
influenced by the rate of expansion of steel—industry capacity. Continuous
casters are difficult to append to existing integrated works whose furnaces
and rolling mills are not laid out in a manner which permits them to be easily
connected by a casting machine. Countries which added capacity in the late
'sixties and early 'seventies, before the application of Continuous casting to
slabs was perfected, are likely to have a smaller share of current output
continuously cast, while those who expanded their capacity subsequently tend
to have a larger share.46Figure i














As our discussion of continuous casting makes clear, the the basic-oxygen
furnace had advantages. In addition to its compatibility with continuous
casting, the BOF, by replacing forced hot air with oxygen and relying solely
on the heat generated by molten ore, eliminated the need for external fuel
sources and reduced heat times by a factor of 12. Table 11 compares the
adoption of basic-oxygen furnaces by U.S. producers and their principal
industrial competitors.47 The U.S. lagged behind Japan in the adoption of the
BOF from the late 1950s and behind Europe from the mid—1970s. As in the case
of continuous casting, the lag reflects several factors. In the 1950s, when
the new technology came on line, U.S. steelmakers had a large amount of
open—hearth capacity in place. The cost savings of replacing an open hearth
in place with a BOF were less than the savings associated with installing a
BOF rather than an open hearth for countries committed to capacity expansion.
Rapidly growing national industries thus were better placed to install the new
technology. In addition, BOFs could accept a maximum of 30 per cent scrap
rather than the 50 per cent typical of open hearths; hence the relative
abundance of scrap in the U.S. attentuated their advantages. Finally,
entrepreneurial intertia cannot be dismissed; early BOFs were developed in
Europe rather than the U.S.. and American producers were slow to appreciate
the advantages of this foreign technology.48
As Table 11 makes clear, some U.S. producers compensated for their
failure to adopt the BOF by installing electric arc furnaces instead. In
1984, the share of electric furnaces in U.S. utilized capacity was 25 per cent
greater than in the other countries considered. Advantages of electric
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Source: International Iron and Steel Institute (1985), Steel Statistical
Yearbook, Brussels: ITSI (various issues).—40--
efficient scale of an electric furnace is 0.8 million tons of steel annually
compared to 6 million tons for a BOF), ability to use 100 per cent scrap
(eliminating the need for coke ovens and blast furnaces and reducing the cost
of raw material inputs by up to 50 per cent), and compatibility with
continuous casting. Karlson (1986) explains the growth of electric furnace
capacity in the U.S. largely on the basis of these factors.
The electric furnace is a central component of the complex of
technologies comprising the minimill. Mi nmills can be constructed for a
fraction of the capital cost of a new integrated mill. Using electric
furnaces in conjunction with continuous casters and a rolling mill, they
initially tended to locate in scrap-abundant regions isolated from integrated
producers by transport costs. Most ininimill firms have not been organized by
the USWA; they pay lower wages and operate under more flexible work rules than
their integrated competitors. They have concentrated mainly on simple,
low-value-added products such as wire rod and reinforcing bar that need not be
produced to high metallurgical standards, leaving to integrated producers the
flat—rolled sheet used in automobiles and appliances. Many minimill firms are
increasingly adapting their methods to the production of high quality bars and
rods, however, and are expected to enter the market for sheet products by the
end of the decade.49 Since U.S. imports tend to be produced by foreign
integrated firms (despite the growing importance of Japanese and Canadian
minimills), the import penetration ratio in the market segment relevant to
minimills is considerably lower than for the American steel industry as a
whole. The same transport costs which provide minimills natural protection
from domestic integrated competitors provide protection from imports. This-41-
market segmentation has begun to break down, however, as minimill firms have
expanded their capacity, moved into product lines traditionally dominated by
integrated works, and penetrated the home turf of integrated firms.
The financial performance of the minimill firms has been consistently
superior to that of their integrated competitors.5° While a number of these
firms have recently experienced financial difficulties, rendering
overoptimistic the enthusiasm of some early analysts, as a group they
continued to outperform their integrated competitors and now account for about
16 per cent of the US, market and 22 per cent of domestic shipments.
Increasingly it appears that the U.S. industry is bifurcating into a
relatively healthy minimill subsector and a declining integrated subsector.
As the example of minimills illustrates, U.S. steel producers remain
active in adopting new technologies. At the same time, their record
illustrates the disadvantages of an early start: having installed large
amounts of capacity in the 1940s and 1950s before the new technologies were
available, those established producers who dominated the integrated sector
were ill placed to adopt subsequent alternatives.
Energy Prices
Higher energy prices have had two sets of countervailing effects on the
competitive position of U.S. basic industries. Insofar as steel and vehicles
are more energy intensive than other sectors, higher energy costs raise prices
and reduce industry employment both at home and abroad. At the same time,
since the share of energy in total costs is greater in the EC and Japan than
in the U.S., higher energy prices tend to strengthen the competitive position
of the U.S. industries vis a vis their foreign counterparts.51 The share of-42--
energy in total costs has been relatively low in the U.S. due to abundant
domestic energy supplies and minimal energy taxation. The importance of these
effects varies greatly across industries, however. At one extreme, since
textile and apparel manufacturing is far from energy intensive, any
comparative advantage accruing to the U.S. has been minimal.52 At the other
extreme, energy costs have a major impact on the demand for automobiles and
are a major element in steel production. As of 1976, coal, fuel oil, natural
gas and electricity accounted for a quarter of major input costs in the U.S.
steel industry. Although the impact of changes in energy costs on U.S. steel
employment is theoretically ambiguous, Grossman (1986) estimates that U.S.
steel-industry employment would have been 3,500 greater in 1976-78 had there
been no change in the relative price of energy, and that higher energy prices
led to the loss of an additional 3,000 jobs between 1979 and 1983. Insofar
as the relative price of energy has fallen subsequently, these effects have
been working in the other direction.
5.Government Policy and Competitiveness
Government policies affecting the basic industries are of two types:
policies explicitly designed to influence output and employment in steel,
autos, textiles and apparel (trade policy, adjustment assistance) and policies
targeted at the economy as a whole but with a special impact on those
industries (macroeconomic policy, pollution abatement regulations).—43—
Trade Policy
U.S. policies governing trade in steel, autos, textiles and apparel
differ from trade policy for other industries by virtue of their reliance on
nontariff measures, notably voluntary export restraints. These forms of trade
policy tend to be implemented in an incremental basis and to have a variety of
unintended consequences which introduce unusual distortions into the pattern
of basic industry trade.
Textiles illustrate those features which distinguish U.S. basic-industry
trade policy from trade policy for other sectors and show how a presumption of
protection comes to be built in to the policy debate with the passage of time.
Voluntary export restraints by Japanese producers were first negotiated in
1937. This agreement established the precedent of handling textile trade
policy separately from the general trade program. In 1955, with Japan's
admission to the GAIT, tariffs on her exports were cut but replaced less than
a year later by VER5 and a five-year plan f or controlling cotton textile and
apparel exports to the US. Thus, nontariff barriers have been a feature of
U.S. textile market for fully half a century. Initially, U.S. textile trade
policy was unique; subsequently, its distinguishing features -—long—lived
protection, reliance on voluntary export restraints, and industry-specific
negotiations —-spreadto other basic industries, notably automobiles and
steel.
Following an interlude during which textile imports were restricted by
the Short-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textile Trade (1961-62) and the
subsequent Long-Term Arrangement (1962-73), the Multif-iber Agreement (MFA) was
concluded as part of the 1973 GAIT negotiations. The Long—Term Agreement had-44-
departed from GAIT rules for manufactured goods by permitting import
restrictions to be applied unilaterally, selectively and without compensation
to the exporter. Moreover, by restricting imports of cotton textiles without
affecting imports of man-made fibers and apparel, these agreements induced
developing countries to shift into the production of the latter. This
provided impetus for the negotiation of a more comprehensive agreement, the
MFA, which initially restricted the growth of textile imports from Japan to
five per cent per annum and from Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Malaysia
to 7-7 1/2 per cent per annum. Imports from new entrants and small suppliers
were treated more favorably. Governments were permitted to impose unilateral
import controls in the event of market disruption (defined as serious damage
to the domestic industry) and to negotiate lower rates of import growth for
items upon which domestic producers were particularly dependent. Quotas were
established through the negotiation of bilateral agreements covering more than
80 per cent of U.S. textile and apparel imports in 1980. Since then, the
quota system has been tightened further. In 1986, when Congress passed a
textile quota bill and attempted to override the President's veto, the U.S.
adopted new agreements with Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The first of these,
for example, limits import growth to 0.8 per cent per annum, compared to 8.6
per cent from 1981 to 1984, and extends coverage to silk blends, ramie and
linen, fibers into which foreign producers have moved in response to previous
restrictions.
Estimating the effects of textile trade policy is rendered difficult by
the nontariff nature of the restrictions and the differentiated nature of the
product (creating problems which arise in attempts to assess automotive and-45--
steel industry trade policy as well).55 Fortunately, for at least some foreign
products it is possible to estimate tariff equivalents indirectly. For the
case of Hong Kong, where export quotas are freely traded, Hamilton (1986) used
data on the unit values of U.S. textile imports and the market value of quotas
to calculate the import tariff equivalent of U.S. quotas. These tariff
equivalents, shown in Figure 11, are both substantial and variable.
Nontariff barriers have significantly reduced U.S. imports of textile
products. The value of U.S. textile and apparel imports (in equivalent square
yards) grew by only 1.3 per cent per annum between 1973 and 1981, while their
composition shifted from textiles to apparel, reflecting differential
treatment of the two categories under the MFA. Over the 1970s, the apparel
share of U.S. textile and apparel imports rose from 35 to 58 per cent.
Insofar as the U.S. possesses a comparative advantage in the production of
highly tailored, high-value-added merchandise rather than unfinished cloth,
this side-effect of quotas has functioned to the disadvantage of the domestic
industry.
Since 1981, import growth has accelerated to 15 per cent per annum. How
could this occur under the provisions of the MFA? First, a newly-negotiated
bilateral agreement with the Peoples Republic of China permitted quota growth
of 10 per cent per annum. Second, the NICs moved into those few remaining
categories not under quota. Third, production shifted to countries such as
Sri Lanka and Mauritius for which quotas did not exist. Fourth, merchandise
may have been shipped through third countries for which quotas were not
binding. The incentive to respond in these ways was undoubtedly heightened by
the dollar's sharp appreciation, which enhanced the profitability of exportingfigure 11








to the U.S. market. The American response was predictable. Firms lobbied for
a tightening of import restrictions and, starting in December 1983, the
Administration moved to establish 300 new textile quotas and to prevent their
circumvention by trans-shipping through third countries. The rate of growth
of textile imports fell to less than seven per cent in 1985. In effect, it
appears that the rate of growth of U.S. imports is given exogenously by policy
in the long run, despite various forms of slippage which offer scope for a
positive price elasticity of supply over short periods of time.
Calculations by l-lufbauer, et al. (1986) imply that restraints depressed
U.S. textile and apparel imports by approximately 28 per cent in 1981. While
offering widely differing estimates of the effect of imports on output and
employment, studies of the textile industry uniformly conclude that output and
employment effects are likely to be smaller than changes in import volumes.
Quotas increase domestic production by less than they reduce imports because
they raise domestic prices, reducing market demand. The percentage change in
domestic textile-industry employment should be roughly equal to the change in
domestic production.56 Using assumptions such as these, Hufbauer, et al.
(1986) calculate that protection permitted the retention in 1981 of 150,000
jobs in textiles and 390,000 in apparel, increasing the total by 26 per cent.
Given the inelasticity of consumer demand for textiles and apparel, domestic
consumers paid a high price per job, on the order of $37,000 1981 dollars.
The American steel industry is another long-time recipient of protection,
the sector's early growth having been greatly stimulated by shelter from
British competition. U.S. steel trade policy takes two forms, one
traditional, one uniquely modern. The traditional form is ant-idumping law,—47—
which protects domestic producers against sales below cost and price
discrimination by foreign competitors. Both practices are prevalent in the
steel industry, since their capital intensity compels foreign firms 'to sell
below average cost during cyclical downturns, and since cartelization and
protection permit them to export at prices below those prevailing in their
home markets. The U.S. has had statutes to deter predatory pricing in
international trade for more than 60 years. Since 1g74, antidumping
investigations have focused on the "constructed value" criterion for dumping,
according to which the U.S. estimates foreign material and fabrication costs
and levies an antidumping duty if import prices fall short of those costsplus
fixed margins for general expenses and profits. This constructed value
criterion provided considerable incentive for U.S. producers to file
antidumping suits, which soon exceeded the government's capacity to process
them. This led in 1977 to the Trigger Price Mechanism (1PM), under which the
government monitored steel imports and, upon finding that steel was imported
at a price below reference prices based on the constructed value of Japanese
steel, automatically triggered a Treasury investigation. The 1PM operated
only so long as the industry refrained from filing antidumping Suits. The
advantages of this mechanism, from an administrative viewpoint, were that it
not only eliminated the burden of antidumping suits but provided the
authorities some insulation from industry pressures. But the 1PM contained
many special features and unintended effects, some of which worked to the U.S.
industry's advantage, others which worked against it (for details, see
Eichengreen and van der Ven, 1984). Ultimately, the industry concluded that
the latter dominated and filed antidumping suits, leading to the TPM's
suspension and in 1982 to its demise.-48-
The second, uniquely modern form that U.S. steel trade policy takes is
VERs like those in textile trade. VERs were negotiated with the Japanese and
European steel industries in 1968, implemented in 1969 and renewed in 1972.
Following the first oil shock and the steel market slump, the U.S. imposed a
series of increasingly stringent trade restrictions, including new VERs and
antidumping investigations culminating in the TPM. VERs on steel like VERs on
textiles were a mixed blessing. As in textiles, foreign suppliers responded
by trading up, shifting to higher value products in which the U.S. might
normally be thought to have a comparative advantage. As in textiles, sales by
nonsignatory countries tended to replace restrained imports, and there were
reports of shipments diverted through third countries. Once VERs were
replaced by the TPM, a "somewhat porous price floor" (Barnett and Schorsch,
1983, p. 240) for steel products was established, and the import share of the
U.S. market stabilized in the neighborhood of 15 per cent.57 That the TPM's
coverage was not limited to foreign producers who were party to explicit
agreements was a major advantage from the U.S. industry's point of view.
Since the TPM's collapse in 1982, U.S. steel trade has again been
governed by VERs. These differ from early agreements by defining permissible
imports as shares of the U.S. market. 1985 VERs were designed to limit import
penetration to 20.5 per cent of the steel market. European producers agreed
to restrain their U.S. sales to shares of U.S. apparent consumption ranging
from 2.2 per cent for tin plate to 21.85 per cent for sheet piling.
Additional VERs were negotiated with Mexico, Brazil and South Africa, and by
the end of 1985 the number of VERs had increased to 15, covering 80 per cent
of the U.S. market. Quotas are administered by the exporting countries via—49-
licensing systems. As a quid pro quo for these agreements, the U.S. industry
has refrained from filing antidumping suits against participating countries.
These VERs have not prevented imports from capturing a rising share of
the U.S. market since 1981. Their coverage is incomplete (Canada as well as
Argentina and Taiwan are excluded), and they can be circumvented by many of
the devices utilized by textile producers. At the same time, their impact is
reflected in the fact that the import penetration ratio fell from 26.2 to 20.5
per cent the month following the conclusion of the mid-1985 VERs. One can get
a sense of the stringency of these agreements by noting that the red cast-iron
telephone booths sold off by British Telecom as souveniers have been counted
against the European steel quota.
Since steel products are heterogeneous and import restrictions take
nonprice forms, measuring their impact is not straightforward. The percent
premium of spot export prices over the U.S. user price is probably the best
measure of the tariff equivalent of VERs and countervailing duties.58 As shown
in Figure 12, except during the 1973-74 commodity boom, when imports subsided
and U.S. exports rose, U.S. user prices have consistently remained above
foreign export prices. The differential hovered in the range of 15 to 30 per
cent over the second half of the 1970s and subsequently grew to nearly 40 per
cent, confirming the increasing stringency of U.S. import restraints.
Measured as tariff equivalents, levels of protection received by the industry
are substantial.
Tsao (1985) estimates for 1983-84 that VERs reduced U.S. imports from the
EC by 17 per cent and total U.S. imports by 15 per cent. A Department of
Commerce study estimates that net imports caused a loss of 148,000 jobs inFigure 12
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steel in 1984; together withTsao'sestimate of the change in imports (and
assuming no change in exports), this implies that U.S. import restrictions
increased steel industry employment by 22,000 workers, or by 15 per cent.59
Grossman's (1986) estimates, in contrast, are predicated upon an elasticity of
production employment with respect to import prices of approximately unity.
Attributing the entire divergence of U.S. user prices from European spot
export prices to the effects of VERs, this implies that U.S. trade
restrictions, by raising effective import prices by 30 per cent, increased
production employment by the same percentage.60 This higher figure should be
regarded as an upper bound, since other variables affecting employment,
notably steelworkers' wages, would have adjusted to the change in import
prices caused by the elimination of VERs; allowing wages to change by the same
percentage as import prices halves the change in production employment, again
resulting in an estimate of 15 per cent. Still other estimates of the change
in production employment are slightly lower (Hufbauer et al., 1986; Cantor,
1984).
U.S. automotive trade policy takes the same form -—voluntaryrestraints
--aspolicy toward textiles and steel. Explicit VERs for automotive trade
are a relatively recent innovation for which textile and steel policies
provided inspiration. Until the mid-1970s, the growing U.S. market share
of Japan was perceived as coming mostly at the expense of Germany and the U.K.
As late as 1910, Japan accounted for less than 20 per cent of total U.S.
imports (see Table 12). But once the first oil—price shock shifted demand
toward smaller, more fuel-efficient cars, Japanese producers were well















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of total U.S. imports and for 15 per cent of the domestic market. In response
to industry complaints, the U.S. then negotiated a voluntary restraint
agreement under which the Japanese agreed to reduce car exports in the year
beginning April 1, 1981 by 7.7 per cent. Japanese exports were held to the
same level for two subsequent years, after which the ceiling was raised by 10
per cent. In 1985 MITI declined to renew the VERs in light of the record
earnings of U.S. automakers, although the Japanese continue to restrain their
exports to the U.S. using traditional forms of administrative guidance.
As in steel and textiles, auto-industry VERs gave rise to a variety of
distortions. They provided Japanese producers an incentive to shift into
jeeps and light trucks not covered by the initial agreement (although this
loophole was closed subsequently). They encouraged the export of components,
leading Congress to consider domestic-content legislation. They provided
nations not covered by the agreement, notably those of Europe, an incentive to
increase shipments to the U.S., and encouraged entry by other foreign
producers, notably Korea and Yugoslavia. They led to direct investment by
Japanese producers in the United States (see Section 7 below).They provided
an incentive for trading up, as Japanese producers shifted into the sale of
more luxurious vehicles.
The effects of quota agreements are difficult to estimate because of the
extent of trading up. Feenstra (1984) has estimated that two-thirds of the
post-agreement rise in Japanese car prices reflected quality change, yielding
an estimate of the increase in quality-adjusted import prices in 1981—82 much
smaller than those of other of other authors.61 He estimates that the reduction
in import volumes and rise in import prices increased domestic production by—52—
8-9 per cent in the first year of VERs and increased production employment by
somewhat less (because of the existence of excess capacity).62 However,
Feenstr&s estimates for 1981-82, a period when U.S. auto demand remained
relatively depressed, may understate the impact fixed import quotas have had
in subsequent years as the domestic market has expanded. Comparisons of the
prices of a Toyota Corolla or a Nissan Sentra -inJapanand the U.S. (e.g.
Crandall, 1986) show that American consumers, who had paid $500 more than
Japanese consumers in 1979-80 before the imposition of VERs, paid $3000 more
in 1985. Assuming that the initial $500 reflects transportation and
preparation, this suggests a tariff—equivalent in excess of 25 per cent
(assuming an $8,000 U.S. sales price). As domestic demand has grown and
quotas have become more binding, their domestic price and output effects
appear to have increased. Auto import restraints are defined as absolute
levels, in contrast to steel import restraints which are denominated as market
shares. One would expect the former to grow more stringent over time. On the
other hand, as new countries have entered the U.S. market -—partly in response
to Japanese VERs --theeffects of these restraints may have been attenuated.
U.S. Industrial Policies
U.S. industrial policies fall
programs, investment subsidies for
more internationally competitive a
to concentrate on export promotion
they tend to concentrate on import
predominant form of assistance for
into three categories: export promotion
modernization, and import protection. The
U.S. industry, the more policymakers tend
schemes; the less competitive, the more
protection. Not surprisingly, the
the U.S. basic industries has been import—53--
protection. Policy toward the steel industry, for example, has been almost
exclusively of this form.
Policy toward the textile industry has been more diverse. The Commerce
Department has lobbied for the removal of foreign barriers to U.S. textile
exports. For nearly two decades it has assisted U.S. textile and apparel
producers wishing to develop export sales by helping them locate foreign sales
agents, holding exhibitions, and organizing seminars on export marketing.
While the U.S. industry has developed a few successful exports, notably blue
jeans, it has essentially remained an import-competing rather than an
exporting sector; in consequence, industry-wide trends in output, employment
and profitability have been little affected by Commerce Department
activities.63 In addition, the industry has received federal low interest
loans through the Public Works and Economic Development Act (EDA) of 1965, the
Trade Acts of 1962 and 1974, and the Small Business Administration Program.
Each of these schemes made funds available to firms unable to secure them
through normal channels, so long as there was a reasonable expectation of
repayment and the proceeds were used for expansion or modernization of
capacity. In practice, the textile and apparel industries have not been major
recipients of funds from these programs.
Although U.S. policy toward the automobile industry is dominated by
import restraints, financial subsidies have also been important, notably in
the case of Chrysler. Assistance to Chrysler starting -in 1979 took the form
of government loan guarantees, which subsidized borrowing by a firm for which
the cost of credit would otherwise have been prohibitive due to bankruptcy
risk. The availability of funds for modernization, in conjunction with the—54—
upturn in the U.S. auto market and the imposition of VERs upon Japan,
permitted Chrysler to repay its government-guaranteed loans. That the loans
were repaid does not change the fact that the government guarantee was a
subsidy to the firm.
Besides protection, the most important form of U.S. policy toward the
basic industries has been adjustment assistance. Adjustment assistance is
designed to provide retraining, education and transitional income for the
newly unemployed. In practice, income transfers have been much more important
than training schemes. According to Arpan et al. (1982), approximately 95 per
cent of adjustment assistance to former apparel-industry have gone into
allowances to replace lost earnings rather than retraining or education. The
number of workers that have been placed by the employment service remains
negligible.
Macroeconomic Policy and Real Exchange Rates
Until recently, economists would have found it difficult to convince
laymen that monetary and fiscal policies rather than sector-specific events
had exercised a decisive impact on the basic industries. However, the
dramatic post-1981 real appreciation of the dollar and its relationship to the
monetary-fiscal mix have heightened awareness of the importance of
macroeconomic f actors.64 In addition, the severity of the post-1979 recession
has reminded observers of the sensitivity of the steel and automobile
industries, as producers of durable goods and of inputs into their
manufacture, to macroeconomic conditions (see Section 3 above).
The budget deficits of the 1980s, combined with a tight anti—inflationary
monetary policy, drove up the relative price of domestic goods by causing a-55-
rapid real appreciation of the dollar. The dollar's strength was a correlary
of the capital inflow needed to absorb the debt issued to finance the deficit,
and was reinforced by greater aggregate demand at home than abroad, which
required for product market equilibrium that demand be shifted away from
domestic goods (see Frankel, this volume). This real appreciation of the
dollar impacted the basic industries because production costs in those
industries are affected by economy-wide conditions and are imperfectly
flexible in own-currency terms. For example, the 58 per cent rise in the
multilateral trade-weighted value of the dollar between 1980 and 1984
dramatically reduced the dollar value of the wages paid by foreign steel,
textile and automobile producers. Table 13 shows the dramatic decline in
German hourly earnings in manufacturing expressed in U.S. dollars and the
smaller but nonetheless significant decline in Japanese dollar-denominated
labor costs over the period 1980:2-1985:1, when the value of the dollar rose
by more than 80 per cent against the Deutchmark and rose by nearly 20 per cent
against the Yen. The rise in dollar-denominated foreign labor costs during
the subsequent period of dollar depreciation is equally dramatic, although
the relationship between the Yen and the Deutchmark -is reversed: whereas the
fall in the nominal yen/dollar rate is nearly twice as fast the second period
as its rise in the first, the fall in the Deutchmark/dollar rate is less than
half as rapid in the second period as its rise in the first.
Nontariff barriers tend to reduce the price sensitivity of U.S. imports
of basic industry products and hence to limit the impact of real exchange
rates on employment in import-competing sectors. In addition, changes over
time in the height of these nontariff barriers renders the price elasticity ofTable 13





Total Private 33.0 0.2
Textiles 34.5 4.6
Apparel 27.8 0.1
Primary Metals 23.7 3.2
Transport Equipment 41.9 1.8
Germany1'
Local Currency 17.8 5.0
U.S. $ -67.4 36.0
Japanc
Local Currency 4.1 25.5
U.S. $ -14.3 59.5
aAverage hourly earnings of nonagricultural production or nonsupervisory
workers, in current dollars.
bHourly earnings in enterprises employing more than ten persons.
CAverage monthly earnings.
Source: For U.S.: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Monthly Labor Review (various issues).
For Germany and Japan: OECD, Main Economic Indicators (various
issues).-56-
production employment extremely difficult to estimate. Estimates in the
appendix (Table A.1) suggest that this elasticity ranges from roughly —0.2 in
textiles and apparel to -0.5 in automobiles and steel. According to these
estimates, the real appreciation of the dollar between the second half of the
1970s and the first half of the 1980s reduced employment in textiles and
apparel by nearly 4 per cent and employment in motor vehicles and steel by
nearly 10 per cent (Table A.2). The greater impact of exchange-rate changes
on autos and steel than on textiles and apparel makes sense when one observes
that the dollar has fluctuated most dramatically (especially since the
beginning of 1985) not against the currencies of developing countries which
are the principal suppliers of textile exports to the U.S. market but against
the currencies of industrial countries such as Germany and Japan which are the
main suppliers of autos and steel.
Pollution Abatement Expenditures
Unlike industry spokesmen, who attach great weight to the impact on
international competitiveness of U.S. pollution abatement expenditures,
academic analyses have generally concluded that the effects of these costs
have been small. Table 14 shows pollution control expenditures as shares of
GNP and investment for 1975, when concern over improving environmental quality
was at its height. U.S. expenditure shares exceed those of its industrial
competitors, with the notable exception of Japan. Table 15 presents three
estimates of environmental expenditure as shares of industry output or final
demand for the U.S. basic industries and import—competing industry as a whole.
Direct costs of environmental regulation include the capital, operating andTable 14













United Kingdom 0.29 1.7
Source: Joseph P. Kalt (1985), 'tlhe Impact of
Domestic Regulatory Policies on Inter-
national Competitiveness,t' Harvard
Institute of Economic Research Dis-
cussion Paper No. 1141, March.Table 15















Textiles 021 1.34 2.66 -0.68
Apparel 0.03 0.66 1.48 —12.39
Iron and steel 1.28 2.38 5.36 -8.70
Motor vehicles
and equipment 0.14 0.99 6.75 -6.19
Average of 31
import-competing
industriesd 0.58 1.54 3.96 -7.64
acents per dollar of industry output.
bcents per dollar of final demand.
CNet exports as per cent of value of shipments.
dwe.ighted by value of total industry output.
Source: Kalt (1985) and author's calculations.—57—
administrative costs of pollution abatement. Direct and indirect costs
include in addition the expenditures of other sectors which produce inputs
into the industries in question. Direct and indirect costs of all regulation
add estimates of the costs of health, safety and economic regulation
(including price and entry restrictions).
The steel industry stands out for its disproportionate direct costs. The
only other industries with comparable burdens are non-ferrous metal mining,
paper products, nonagricultural mechnicals, electric power generation and the
government sector.65 In contrast, the direct environmental quality
expenditures of the textile, apparel and automotive industries are well below
the U.S. average. When both direct and indirect costs are considered, costs
to the steel industry remain above average, but to a lesser extent. Once
other regulatory (notably mileage and carbon-dioxide-related) costs are added,
vehicles join steel with regulatory burdens in excess of the U.S.
average. Clearly, regulatory costs have affected steel and automobiles very
differently than textiles and apparel.
Figure 13 takes a closer look at the direct pollution abatement
expenditures of the U.S. and Japanese steel industries.66 Japanese
expenditures per ton of steel output peaked in 1976. (1976 also marked the
peak of Japanese environmental control expenditures as a share of total
investment, at 21 per cent.) Japanese expenditures fell thereafter, although
they turned up in the early 1980s when more stringent water pollution, dust
and soot regulations were imposed. U.S. expenditures also rose in the early
1970s, but from a lower level, and remained stable at a higher plateau into
the 1980$. Although the time profile of expenditure differed acrossFigure 13
Torts ot Crude Steel OUtpLLt-58--
countries, there is little evidence that the U.S. industry bore a heavier
burden overall.
At the same time, expenditures by both the U.S. and Japanese steel
industries have vastly exceeded those of semi-industrialized countries where
the pressure to improve environmental quality generally is less intense,
placing both industries at something of a disadvantage relative to
competititors in lower-income countries.67 Looking across industries, Kalt
(1985) finds that higher environmental costs have led to a significant
deterioration in U.S. trade performance. As incomes in developing countries
continue to rise and their demands for environmental protection grow, any U.S.
disadvantage due to environmental regulation can be expected to decline. But
this is likely to be a source of little relief in the decades immediately
ahead.
6.Wider Impact on the U.S. Economy
Import penetration and declining basic-industry employment have wider
implications for the American economy. Of the various effects that might be
considered, this section focuses on three: implications for the current
account of the balance of payments, implications for the income distribution,
and implications for the regional location of industrial activity.
On the surface, the basic industries appear to have contributed
significantly to the U.S. merchandise trade deficit. Steel imports are least
important in the aggregate: in 1984, U.S. steel imports were only three per
cent of total merchandise imports, and the deficit on trade in steel was only
eight per cent of the total merchandise deficit. The figures for textiles and—59-
apparel are larger: textile and apparel imports were 5.8 per cent of total
U.S. merchandise imports, while the textile and apparel deficit was 14.1 per
cent of the overall merchandise trade deficit. The most important basic
industry deficit was that in motor vehicle trade: passenger cars accounted
for 9.1 per cent of U.S. imports and 22.4 per cent of the deficit. Thus,
together these four basic industries accounted for 44.5 per cent of the
merchandise trade deficit.
It does not follow from this fact that trends in the basic industries
are a cause of the current account deficit in any meaningful economic sense.
The current account is a macroeconomic variable determined by relationships
among other macroeconomic variables, notably by any imbalance between savings
and investment. Thus, the current account deficit results ultimately from
those macroeconomic policies influencing aggregate savings and investment
behavior. Developments affecting particular industries determine only the
composition of the current account, not its level. Trends in the basic
industries influence the current account only insofar as their prospects
affect the economy-wide investment climate or their performance affects
economy—wide levels of employment and profitability sufficiently to alter the
aggregate level of savings.
Observers of the American economy have expressed concern that the real
incomes of wage earners have failed to rise at historical rates or to keep
pace with the cost of living. As Figure 7 indicates, the declining shares of
steel and motor vehicles in total manufacturing employment represent a
shift from high wage categories of manufacturing employment to lower paid
jobs. The elimination of "quality jobs," it is suggested, lowers blue—collar
earnings and reduces labor's share of national income.-60-
Were imports of steel and motor vehicles suddenly eliminated, employment
in these -industries could be considerably expanded even if the wage premia
enjoyed by steel— and auto-workers were maintained. But whether average
blue-collar earnings and labor's share of GNP rose or fell would depend on who
financed the redistribution. The standard economic argument is that those
factors of production used most intensively by the protected industries would
benefit, while factors used intensively by other sectors would pay for the
redistribution. That steel and motor vehicle production is highly capital
intensive compared to the economy as a whole suggests that protection for
steel and automobiles would raise the demand for capital more than demand for
labor. Shareholders would be the principal beneficiaries of protection for
the steel and vehicle industries. While workers with industry-specific skills
would benefit in the short run, in the long run artificial stimulus for these
industries is likely to reduce -—notincrease ——labor'sshare of national
income.
The relative decline of the U.S. basic industries has major implications
for the regional distribution of manufacturing employment. Tables 16 through
19 show how employment in apparel, textiles, steel and vehicles has been
concentrated regionally and how that concentration has shifted over time.
Apparel—industry employment, for example, already concentrated at the
beginning of the 1970s in the Middle Atlantic region has tended to shift south
and westward (see Table 16). In large part this reflects the attractions of
low wage labor in regions where unionization rates are low. Trends in
textiles (Table 17) resemble those in apparel. Textile-industry employment is
concentrated in six South Atlantic states, with North Carolina, South CarolinaTable 16
Apparel and Other Textile Products (SIC 23):
Number of Employees and Number of Establishments




Emp. Est. Emp. Est. Emp. Est.
1. Pacific 5.6 6.5 9.0 17.9 10.7 20.6
2. Mountain o.i 1.1 1.5 1.9 1.2 2.0
3. West N. Central 3.7 3.4 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.0
4. West S. Central 6.7 4.1 9.0 5.3 7.5 4.8
5. East S. Central 12.3 4.1 14.2 4.8 15.8 5.1
6. East N. Central 6.9 6.6 6.5 6.1 5.5 5.3
7. New England 5.6 6.6 4.9 5.1 5.0 4.7
8. Middle Atlantic 38.5 65.7 29.4 46.1 26.4 39.3
9. South Atlantic 19.8 2.1 21.8 9.7 24.7 15.2
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Source: Calculated from County Business Patterns (various issues).Table 17
Textile Mill Products (SIC 22):
Number of Employees and Number of Establishments




Emp. Est. Emp. Est. Emp. Est.
1. Pacific 1.4 6.5 2.1 6.0 2.1 7.1
2. Mountain 01a 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.0
3. West N. Central 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.4
4. West S. Central 1.4 1.3 1.9 2.3 1.4 2.3
5. East S. Central 9.4 4.9 10.0 5.7 9.6 6.1
6. East N. Central 2.4 3.6 2.1 4.2 2.6 4.6
7. New England 8.9 12.2 7.6 10.3 7.9 9.9
8. Middle Atlantic 15.1 36.0 12.3 31.3 11.1 28.3
9. South Atlantic 61.0 34.5 63.3388 64.4 39.4
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
aldaho and New Mexico not available.
Source: Calculated from County Business Patterns (various issues).Table 18
Blast Furnace and Basic Steel Products (SIC 331):
Number of Employees and Number of Establishments




Emp. Est. Emp. Est. Emp. Est.
1. Pacific 4.1 10.2 4.1 11.3 3.0 9.8
2. Mountain 00a 0.5 2.1 1.5 2.5 1.8
3. West N. Central 17b 3.6 1.8 4.3 2.3 3.6
4. West S. Central 2.Oc 5.4 3.1 8.0 4.6 8.2
5. East S. Central 6.0 6.8 5.5 6.3 4.8 15.7
6. East N. Central 42.4 32.7 41.6 30.7 45.0 27.9
7. New England 1•5d 6.6 1.7 6.9 1.7 6.9
8. Middle Atlantic 340e27.1 31.4 21.5 25.9 17.5
9. South Atlantic 8.37.2 8.8 9.5 10.2 8.5
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
aNevada, Utah, Colorado n.a.
biowa n.a.
COkiahoma n.a.
dRhode Island, New Hampshire n.a.
eNew Jersey n.a.
Delaware n.a.
Source: Calculated from County Business Patterns (various issues).Table 19
Motor Vehicles and Equipment (SIC 371):
Number of Employees and Number of Establishments




Emp. Est. Emp. Est. Emp. Est.
1. Pacific 5.3 18.4 6.2 19.2 1.5 18.3
2. Mountain 0.2 1.9 0.5 3.9 1.3 3.9
3. West N. Central 6.9 9.4 7.2 8.3 10.7 7.9
4. West S. Central 2.0 8.3 2.6 9.6 7.1 9.7
5. East S. Central 26a 4.3 5.3 9.0 6.0
6. East N. Central 68.5 34.4 63.4 29.6 46.1 31.0
7. New England 1.7 3.7 1.4 3.1 2.3 3.0
8. Middle Atlantic 80b10.2 8.2 11.5 11.4 10.2
9. South Atlantic 47C 6.2 9.4 10.6 10.1




Source: Calculated from County Business Patterns (various issues).—61-
and Georgia alone accounting for more than half of total industry employment.
This geographical concentration has continued to increase over time.
Steel industry employment has been concentrated traditionally in Western
Pennsylvania, the vicinity of the Great Lakes and, to a lesser extent,
California. Compared to the coasts, the Midwest retains a small margin of
natural protection due to the transport costs of shipping steel from Europe or
Japan.68 Table 18 again reflects a tendency for industry to migrate toward
the low-wage, nonunionized South, where the growth of minimills has been
particularly rapid. The Mid-Atlantic has been particularly hard hit by the
decline in steel industry employment.
Motor vehicle industry employment is concentrated, of course, in the East
North Central (Table 19). But in this industry also, employment has tended
to migrate toward the East South Central and South Atlantic regions.
A decline in basic industry employment need not imply either a persistent
unemployment problem or the disappearance of manufacturing jobs. A dramatic
counterexample is provided by Massachusetts, where a transition from dependence
on the textile industry to sectors based on new technologies has been
successfully completed (for details, see Ferguson and Ladd, 1986). Yet this
experience is does not provide a case for untempered optimism. Massachusetts
suffered from unemployment in excess of the national average for an extended
period prior to its post-1975 recovery; thus, its experience does not suggest
that adjustment will be either quick or painless. Second, the reduction in
Massachusetts unemployment resulted not from exceptional rates of job creation
but from below average population and labor force growth. Unemployment fell
because Massachusetts was no less successful than the rest of the country in-62-
creating new jobs (a significant achievement itself) and because the
Commonwealth's depressed economy discouraged in-migration. Third,
Massachusetts has singular advantages that enable it to exploit the
opportunities offered by high-tech industries, notably a large educational
complex. Whether other states can complete their transition with the same
success remains to be determined. But by demonstrating the role of an
educational infrastructure -in facilitating the transfer of resources, the
Massachusetts example may contain lessons for the design of public policy
toward the regional problem.
7.Response of the Industries
Two avenues for enhancing competitiveness --reducinginput costs and
obtaining additional protection --havealready been addressed. This section
considers three additional means to this end: the development of new products
and processes, investment -in the U.S. by foreign companies, and
diversification.
New Products and Processes
Criticism of U.S. basic industries for lagging their foreign
competititors in the adoption of new technologies should not be allowed to
obscure the technological dynamism of many firms. For the basic industries,
advances in manufacturing methods offer more promise than the development of
new products. The speed of process innovation will depend on the success with
which basic industries apply new technologies developed -in the high-tech
sector. Much progress has already taken place. In the steel industry,-63-
automation and computer control of continuous-caster operations enhance
control of caster speed, liquid levels and cooling rates while reducing labor
requirements. Computers are increasingly used to regulate fuel consumption in
rolling processes and to control the quality of feed input in blast furnaces.
Even in an industry whose output is apparently as homogenous as steel,
there is scope for product innovation. Ladle refining systems, which permit
the production of higher quality 'clean1' steel, have been widely adopted in
recent years. Five electrolytic galvanizing lines, recently completed or
currently under construction, promise to increase by 500 per cent the
industry's capacity to supply the automotive industry with corrosion
resistant, uniformly formable electrogalvanized steel. Lasers are used to
refine the magnetic domain structure of electrical steel for transformers,
improving product quality and permitting a price premium to be charged.69
Process innovation in the automotive industry is proceeding apace.7°
Microprocessor-controlled flexible machining centers capable of fabricating
parts for power-steering pumps and alternators have recently been introduced.
These machines can change tools without operator assistance as needed for new
jobs. Assembling the parts produced by such machines into completed
components is a more delicate task; machines with these capabilities remain at
the prototype stage, although robotics have been applied to stamping and to
engine, body and final assembly.71 Computer numerical control has been
introduced into engine and transmission machining. Computer-aided design has
reduced design costs and lead times, while computer-aided engineering has
reduced the cost of skilled tool-room labor. Computer modeling of production
flows has reduced inventory costs, enhanced stock control, and helped to
automate product inspection.—64—
As with steel, the scope for product innovation in the motor vehicle
industry is less extensive than in many other sectors. Rather than
fundamental changes in the nature of vehicles, it principally takes the form
of incremental innovations which enhance their capabilities. For example,
on—board computers are increasingly used to monitor engine performance.
Electronic traction and skid control can be used to enhance operator control.
While the cumulative impact of these improvements can be substantial, it
remains unlikely, as Altshuler et al. (1984) conclude, that in the foreseeable
future product innovation will radically transform the automobile.
In the textile and apparel industries, technological progress has been
less rapid. Nonetheless, at the grading stage, new computer methods are
available for selecting the best combination of fibers for a given end use and
for eliminating the blend variations associated with hand feeding. At the
spinning and weaving stages, technological progress has already led to
refinements of existing technology. At the assembly stage, modest
technological advances, such as the automated pocket-maker, have been adopted
by many firms. The cost of these new technologies is prohibitive for all but
the largest producers.This will be even more the case once research
currently underway in Japan and New England leads to the development of
flexible sewing systems based on robot technology like that already in place
in the automobile industry.72
What relief from import competition does innovation offer the U.S. basic
industries? Although process innovations will remain a critical determinant
of comparative production costs, it is unlikely that their adoption will
eliminate the gap between production costs in the U.S. and in its industrial-65—
competitors, notably Japan. New technologies applicable to the basic
industries diffuse rapidly among industrial countries; there is no reason to
anticipate that the U.S. will be able to appropriate such technologies and
sustain a competitive advantage by adopting them to a greater extent than
other industrial countries. Insofar as new manufacturing methods entail the
substitution of capital for labor, new technologies that increase thescope
for substitution may reduce the disadvantage of U.S. basic industries
vis—a—vis their LDC competitors. But as the NICs continue to develop and
their labor costs rise in the manner of Japan's, the importance of such
savings will shrink.
Competitive advantages due to product innovation derive from producers'
ability to tailor new products to the tastes and requirements of consumers.
The proximity of U.S. producers to what remains a relatively large domestic
market situates them favorably in this effort to adapt their products to the
preferences of consumers and end users. The production of electrogalvanized
steel for the U.S. automobile industry and designer clothing by the apparel
industry, cited above, illustrate this potential. Yet the sobering example of
the auto industry in the 1970s is a reminder that mere proximity to the market
is no guarantee of success in tailoring products to final demand.
Joint Ventures and Onshore Production by Foreign Firms
The advent of Japanese automobile production in the United States is the
most visible illustration of a general trend. Honda now operates a plant in
Marysville, Ohio and Nissan one in Smyrna, Tenessee, while Toyota and GM
jointly produce a small car in what was formerly GM's Fremont, California-66-
assembly plant. Together these three operations produced more than 500,000
vehicles in 1986. Mazda, Mitsubishi and Isuzu/Fuji have plans for plants in
Michigan, Illinois and Indiana, respectively. In 1984, Nisshin Steel acquired
a stake in Wheeling-Pittsburgh and Nippon Kokan obtained half of National
Steel, while in 1986 Kawasaki Steel acquired half of California Steel.
Moreover, there is an increasing foreign presence in the U.S. minimill
sector.
To some extent these arrangements represent attempts to import Japanese
technology, management and labor-relations techniques in efforts to boost
productivity. For example, workers at the Nissan and Honda plants and at
California Steel's plant in Fontana are organized into teams responsible not
only for regular production duties but for inspection, materials handling and
housekeeping.73 Moreover, onshore production enhances the ability of Japanese
steelmakers to tailor output to their customers in the U.S. automobile
industry, an important consideration for producers of coated—steel products.
But the principal explanation for onshore production is as a response to U.S.
protectionism and as a hedge against even more stringent measures. Not only
can the Japanese protect against this risk by producing in the United States,
but this strategy itself reduces the danger of tighter trade restrictions by
diverting the sales of Japanese companies from goods manufactured abroad to
those manufactured in the United States.
Japanese-owned automobile companies project that "immigrant plants" will
produce 1.8 million vehicles for the U.S. market by 1990. Since domestic
demand is projected to grow slowly, these sales are likely to come partly at
the expense of Japanese exports and partly at that of the U.S. competition.—67—
While onshore production by foreign firms is likely to slow the decline of
U.S. auto-industry employment, it will only add to the difficulty domestic
firms have had in maintaining market share.
Diversification
A final response on the part of U.S. basic industries is diversification.
This can be understood as part of a long-standing strategy to make the basic
industries "less basic." As early as 1969-71, 30 cents of every dollar
invested by steel firms was invested outside of steel-producing activities; by
the late 1970s the ratio had risen to 33 per cent.74 USX (formerly the U.S.
Steel Corporation) has found new outlets for its managerial and financial
resources through acquisitions ranging from chemicals and engineering to real
estate and railroads. The same strategy has been adopted by Japanese steel
producers, who have branched into areas as diverse as industrial ceramics and
silicon wafers. The principal thrust of USX's diversification has been into
energy, notably through its acqisition of Marathon Oil in 1982 and Texas Oil
and Gas in 1986. At present, only one-third of USX's revenues come from
steel, with oil and gas now accounting for a majority of total sales. While
this too represents an attempt to move into more promising sectors, it is also
a continuance of the steel industry's traditional strategy of using
diversification to reduce the cyclical risks of steelmaking. Since energy is
an important component of the cost of producing steel, through the ownership
of energy resources, steel companies can hedge against the effects of higher
energy prices.—68-
8.Future Prospects
What are the prospects for the basic industries in the United States?
Clearly, the international product cycle will continue to operate. Competence
in the production of the products of basic industries tends to be acquired in
the early stages of industrialization. This international diffusion of
standardized technologies is beyond the control of American producers and
policymakers. Hence developing countries where the costs of labor and raw
materials are low should have a continuing if not an increasing competitive
advantage in the production of standardized basic industry goods. U.S. basic
industries, particularly those segments using standardized processes to
produce standardized products, will experience no relief from foreign
competition.
The precise impact of this foreign competition will depend on the stance
of U.S. trade policies. For the forseeable future, trade in the products of
these industries will continue to be regulated by "voluntary" restraints and
bilateral quota agreements rather than tariff protection. There is no reason,
if quotas are set at sufficiently restrictive levels, that production for the
U.S. market could not take place domestically. Studies of U.S. trade policy
unanimously conclude that the costs of such policies are high, however. Not
only do the high prices charged domestic consumers of the products of basic
industries translate into a very substantial cost per protected job, but they
divert scarce U.S. resources into the basic industries and out of alternative
uses where their productivity is higher. The competitive difficulties of the
U.S. basic industries are the market's way of signaling that productivity
there is relatively low. Permitting these industries to release resources and-69-
even facilitating their smooth transfer through adjustment assistance programs
is a way of responding constructively to the productivity slowdown that has
been the subject of so much recent attention.
None of this implies that the U.S. basic industries should or will
vanish. U.S. producers will retain some comparative advantage vis a vis
developing-country competitors wherever product quality and marketing are
important --thatis, where skilled labor and proximity to the consumer confer
comparative advantage. Those segments of the American automotive, steel and
apparel industries producing high performance automobiles; electrogalvanized
steel and designer clothing, for example, have brighter prospects than the
basic industries as a whole. The ability of the U.S. basic industries to
exploit this advantage, which other industrial countries share, depends on
their ability to maintain quality, to successfully tailor goods to market, and
to moderate production costs, three areas where their record is not
unblemished.
Most of all, the competitiveness of these segments of the U.S. basic
industries will depend on their ability to apply the new technologies
developed by the high-tech sector. Robots, computer-controlled machine tools
and other forms of automated technology continue to offer improvements in
productivity and quality control. They are the domestic industries' hope of
maintaining a competitive advantage as existing technologies continue to
diffuse to newly industrializing countries. Located in a country rich in the
human capital used to develop these new technologies, U.S. basic industries
might be thought to possess a comparative advantage in their adoption. But
much depends on the foresightedness of domestic producers and on public-70-
policy. If macroeconomic policies fail to keep domestic demand from declining
and the real exchange rate from rising as wildly as in recent years, the
investment required for the adoption of these technologies will not take
place. If domestic producers are provided overly generous protection, they
will have little incentive to develop and adopt these new technologies.
Policies of protection which increase basic industry employment in the present
may not be conducive to the prosperity of the U.S. basic industries in the
future.—71—
Appendix: Regression Results
This appendix presents regression results cited in the text. Using
quarterly data for the period 1973:1-1986:1, employment is regressed on
measures of the real exchange rate, the relative price of energy, the
economy-wide unemployment rate and the sectoral real wage. Data and
specification follow Branson and Love (1986) with three modifications. First,
the dependent variable is number of production employees instead of total
employees. Second, a distributed lag on average hourly earnings is appended
to their basic specification to permit the impact of labor costs on employment
to be examined. Third, the sample period is altered, starting only in 1973:1
and extending through 1986:1. Data on both number of production employees and
hourly earnings are drawn from Department of Labor, Employment and Earnings
(various issues). Hourly earnings are deflated by the CPI to construct a
measure of the real wage. Other data are as described by Branson and Love.
The real exchange rate is the IMF index of relative unit labor costs; the real
energy price index is the CPI-Urban energy price index divided by the
CPI-Urban index for all consumer goods; the unemployment rate is for all
workers, economy-wide.
Results appear in Table A.1. While the results for all manufacturing are
quite satisfactory, the results for the four basic industries vary. In
contrast to all manufacturing, employment in each shows a significant downward
trend even after controlling for cyclical conditions, the real exchange rate,
the real price of energy, and the sectoral real wage. Only the textile































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































captured by the coefficients on the civilian unemployment rate). There is
considerable variability -in the impact of energy prices, which increases as
one moves from textiles to apparel to steel and finally to motor vehicles.
The large coefficients in the equations for vehicles and steel suggest that
the energy price variable may also be picking up the impact of structural
factors (shifts toward smaller cars or steel substitutes whose timing
coincides with the energy price shocks). Similarly, changes in the real
exchange rate had a more powerful impact on motor vehicles and steel than
textiles and apparel, suggesting that the MFA limited the effects of import
competition even more severely than automobile and steel VERs. Finally, the
impact of real wages is generally negative but uniformly weak. (Before
concluding from this that firms do not operate on their labor demand curves,
it would be useful to adjust hourly earnings for productivity and to deflate
them by a measure of sector-specific producer prices).
Table A.2 uses these regressions to decompose changes in U.S.
competitiveness (as they are reflected in changes in production employment)
into these four components and a residual. The first line shows that slack
macroeconomic conditions, real exchange-rate appreciation and higher energy
prices all tended to reduce U.S. manufacturing employment between the second
half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Only some slight
decline of real manufacturing wages moderated the trend. Of these factors
the dollar's real appreciation was the most important; by itself it would have
caused production employment in manufacturing to fall by more than an eighth.
But U.S. manufacturing employment declined considerably less than the
movement of these variables would predict. Other sources of enhancedTable A.2
Decomposition of Trends in U.S. Basic Industry Employment
from 1973:1—1980:]. to 1981:1—1986:1












All Manufacturing —8.4 —7.2 —13.3 —2.0 0.513.6
Textiles (SIC 22) -20.2 —3.2 -4.7 1.4 0.1-13.8
Apparel (SIC 23) —13.9 —3.5 -2.4 5.0 5.4—18.4
Iron and Steel (SIC331) -47.9 —6.1 -9.7 —24.1 1.4—9.4
Motor Vehicles (SIC371) -16.5 —5.7 -9.6 -26.0 0.6 24.2
Source: Computed from regressions reported in Table A.].. "Other Factors"
incorporates the trend term and the regression residual.—73—
competitiveness ("other factors" in Table A.2) contributed significantly to
the maintenance of manufacturing employment over the period.
The basic industries show many of the same patterns but important
differences as well. Employment in steel and vehicles is more cyclically
sensitive than employment in textiles and apparel, is more strongly affected
by movements in the real exchange rate, and is more responsive to changes in
the relative price of energy. Although the recent moderation of real
manufacturing wages has stimulated employment in all four industries, the
contribution of wage trends to the change in total industry employment has
been relatively small. A striking feature of the table is the contrast in the
impact of "other factors" between motor vehicles and the other basic
industries. In textiles, apparel and iron and steel, these other factors
contributed to the decline in production employment over the period. The
interpretation of this finding is that the further intensification of foreign
competition tended to add to the three industries' competitive woes. In
automobiles, in contrast, other factors account for a significant rise in
production employment. Whether this has been due to increased barriers to
foreign competition, notably the negotiation of Japanese export restraints
in 1981, or to new investment, marketing and product-development strategies on
the part of the U.S. automobile producers cannot to be determined by
regression alone.—74—
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